The Europeanisation of the law on legitimate expectations : recent case law of the English and European Union courts on the protection of legitimate expectations in administrative law by DRABKIN-REITER, Esther
 
 
The Europeanisation of the law on 
legitimate expectations 
Recent case law of the English and European Union 
courts on the protection of legitimate expectations 




Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Master in Comparative, European and International Laws (LL.M.) 
of the European University Institute 
Florence, September, 2015 

 
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
The Europeanisation of the law on legitimate expectations 
Recent case law of the English and European Union courts on the 











Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Master in Comparative, European and International Laws (LL.M.) 
of the European University Institute 
Supervisor 
Professor Loïc Azoulai, European University Institute 
 
© Esther Drabkin-Reiter, 2015 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
 
Summary of Thesis 
This thesis considers the Europeanisation of English administrative law, in the specific 
context of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. It assesses whether, how and 
to what extent the way in which the way in which legitimate expectations are protected in EU 
law has influenced the protection of legitimate expectations in English law. To make this 
assessment, a thorough analysis is conducted of case law in both jurisdictions. 
The thesis is structured into five main Chapters. Chapter A provides an introduction and 
looks at some general issues surrounding the concept of legitimate expectation, including 
which expectations are protectable and what is meant by “legitimacy”. Chapter B traces the 
development of the protection of legitimate expectations in English and EU law, and 
considers certain particular features in more detail for each jurisdiction, with the aim of 
establishing some parameters against which more recent case law can be tested and 
compared. In Chapter C an in-depth analysis of recent case law of the English courts, both 
falling within and outside the scope of EU law, is undertaken, and comparisons are drawn 
between these cases and with the traditional position of EU law on the protection of 
legitimate expectations. Chapter D contains a similar analysis in respect of recent cases of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, Chapter E draws these analyses together and 
concludes that while there is limited convergence in the way English and EU courts approach 
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My research question seeks to ascertain whether and how the protection of legitimate 
expectations in English administrative law1 has been subjected to the phenomenon of 
“Europeanisation”, whereby as a result of national courts’ exposure to European Union law 
through their obligation to apply it in particular situations, national legal principles become 
aligned with their European counterparts. In fact, this thesis will demonstrate that English 
courts have mostly been resistant to any influence of EU law in the field of legitimate 
expectations. Even in cases falling within the scope of EU law, where English courts are 
under an obligation to apply the EU law principle of legitimate expectations, they have still 
expressed and applied the test in English law terms.  
Briefly, and generally, a legitimate expectation in the context of administrative law is some 
legal interest that a natural or legal person can invoke to require some part of the State 
apparatus to act or refrain from acting, although such behaviour is not otherwise mandated by 
law. There are three main actors in a typical legitimate expectation relationship, and the 
treatment of these actors in case law will form the basis for the subsequent discussion and the 
case analysis. These actors are: an individual or undertaking, usually a member of the public;2 
a public authority or other State entity who has allegedly breached the legitimate expectation, 
and in most cases created it; and the courts, whose role it is to decide whether an interest 
amounting to a legitimate expectation has indeed been breached, and whether that breach was 
justified.3 
The following Chapters will consider some general issues surrounding the concept of 
legitimate expectation (Chapter A), provide some background on the way that legitimate 
expectations have been protected in English and EU law in the past (Chapter B), analysis 
recent case law of the English and EU courts (Chapters C and D) and draw these analyses 
together with some conclusions (Chapter E). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 In what follows, all references to “English law” and “English courts” should be read as referring to the law is it 
applied in England and Wales and the courts of England and Wales respectively. 
2 In certain situations the “individual” might be another public authority: see, for example, R (Luton Borough 
Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin). 
3 In what follows, different terms will be used to refer to each of these three actors, depending on the context. 
The individual may be referred to as the representee, the promisee or the claimant or applicant bringing a 
judicial review claim. The public authority or State entity may also be referred to as the local council or the 
representor. “The Court” refers to the Court of Justice of the European Union unless otherwise indicated. 
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I. What is Europeanisation? 
The potential for a transfer of administrative legal principles from EU law to national law has 
long been recognised in the academic literature.4 In a multi-layered system such as the 
European Union, where national courts must apply European law in cases before them whose 
subject matter falls within the scope of EU law, it is possible that even in cases involved 
purely domestic situations (those involving national law only), judges will begin to modify 
domestic principles so that they begin to coincide with their counterparts in European law.5  
Such a process may be termed the “Europeanisation” of domestic laws. It has been explained 
on the basis that it may be difficult for judges to apply two conceptions of the same legal 
principle in tandem, depending on the subject matter of the case, without one influencing the 
other.6 There is greater scope for such a process to occur in the area of administrative law 
where the same behaviour (acts of the administration) will be tested against legal principles 
originating from EU or English law, depending on its subject matter. However, it is also 
possible that in such a situation a domestic legal principle develops independently of its 
European counterpart – judges might reason by analogy with other domestic legal principles, 
or with reference to the national constitutional tradition. 
II. The nature of a legitimate expectation 
At once one of the most important and difficult questions to answer in setting up the issues 
which will be subsequently explored is what exactly a “legitimate expectation” is. Courts and 
academic commentators have suggested many different formulations,7 but it is difficult to 
identify an overarching definition that covers all situations which the concept can apply to, 
not least given the fact that a “legitimate expectation” can mean different things depending on 
the administrative law traditions of the jurisdiction in which it is invoked. As a generalised 
starting point one can take Calmes’ explanation of the role of legitimate expectations: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 27; Schwarze, “The Convergence of the 
Administrative Laws of the EU Member States” in Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law (2000). 
5 Boymans and Eliantonio, “Europeanization of Legal Principles? The Influence of the CJEU’S Case Law on the 
Principle of Legitimate Expectations in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (2013) 19(4) European 
Public Law 715, 716. 
6 Schwarze, “The Convergence of the Administrative Laws of the EU Member States” in Snyder (ed), The 
Europeanisation of Law (2000) p 181. 
7 See, for example, Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 1; Boymans and 
Eliantonio, “Europeanization of Legal Principles? The Influence of the CJEU’S Case Law on the Principle of 
Legitimate Expectations in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (2013) 19(4) European Public Law 715, 
718; R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [17]. 
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operation of law as protection against illegitimate changes of policy by public power.8 In the 
following section I will seek to unpack the term “legitimate expectations” a little more, in the 
hope of understanding it better. 
1. What is a protectable expectation? 
The standard case of legitimate expectation9 focusses on the state of mind of the individual, 
which is clear from the very terminology employed – the word “expectation” implies a belief 
or idea about a certain state of affairs. Taking the first definition of expectation in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, namely “the action or fact of anticipating or foreseeing something; the 
belief that something will happen or be the case”,10 it is clear that an expectation is something 
more than a mere hope in relation to the future. The English courts have explained this 
difference as a requirement that a clear understanding and acceptance on the part of the 
individual or any representation must be present. Where no such understanding of acceptance 
was present, the applicant might be said to have a hope, but not an expectation.11 In German 
academic literature, a similar distinction has been drawn between a mere expectation 
(Erwartung) and an individual’s trust worthy of protection (Vertrauen).12  
However, it is also worth noting that in certain cases where a legitimate expectation has been 
found, this has occurred notwithstanding the complete lack of knowledge of the applicant of 
the conduct that is claimed generated the expectation. In English law, this is the case where a 
legitimate expectation is based on “conspicuous unfairness”, rather than reliance on a specific 
representation made by a public authority.13 In EU law, a legitimate expectation may arise 
automatically where an individual’s EU law rights are curtailed abruptly and without notice.14 
2. What is “legitimate”? 
A further question is when an expectation will be considered “legitimate”. This term is used 
in many different ways in the authorities and it is not clear whether legitimacy is a legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8 Calmes, Du principe de la confiance légitime en droits allemande, communautaire et français (2001). 
9 There are certain exceptions, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
10 Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition, 2015). 
11 Sedley LJ in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 
1133D to E. The judge may have been influenced by the fact that the representation relied on was not made to 
the applicant, but to another individual also affected by the policy change. 
12 Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz als Verfassungsprinzip (2002) pp 376 et seq. 
13 Rashid v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744. 




construct,15 a factual test or simply a label applied to an expectation that the court considers 
should be upheld. Watson notes that legitimacy should be concerned with factual, rather than 
normative considerations – once certain facts are in place and a legitimate expectation arises, 
then a decision can be taken as to whether to uphold or deny that expectation, by balancing 
the interests of the individual claiming the legitimate expectation with those of the wider 
public. However, he accepts the problems caused by the word “legitimate” regarding the 
normative implications of validity which it raises for the factual situations it is applied to. He 
suggests “reasonable” as a better term to describe expectations that should, absent an 
overriding public interest, be upheld, but accepts that the use of the term “legitimate” is now 
ingrained in the judicial protection of expectations.16 By contrast, Schonberg does see a 
normative function for the term “legitimate”, noting that such legitimacy in the protection of 
legitimate expectations in EU law arises from the balancing act between the individual 
interest and that of the wider public.17 
Recent case law of the English courts has indicated different – but limited – interpretations of 
“legitimacy”: some judges have considered it arises upon reliance on the expectation,18 or the 
reasonableness of the expectation or reliance on it;19 others have considered the power of the 
authority to make the representation to be determinative of the legitimacy of the 
expectation.20 
3. A legitimate expectation as an interest, right or principle? 
There is general agreement that legitimate expectations are not rights – this can be seen in 
their contradistinction from the concept of “droits acquis” or vested rights.21 Furthermore, 
although the administration may have a duty to take legitimate expectations into account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
15 Elliot, “Legitimate Expectation, Consistency and Abuse of Power: the Rashid Case” [2005] Judicial Review 
281 at [8]. 
16 Watson, “Clarity and Ambiguity: a new approach to the test of legitimacy in the law of legitimate 
expectations” [2010] Legal Studies 633, 634 to 635. 
17 Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 118. 
18 Sedley LJ in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 
1133D to E. 
19 R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [39]; R (Bibi) v 
Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [21] and [46]. 
20 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [21] and [46]; Henry Boot Homes v 
Bassetlaw District Council [2002] EWCA Civ 983. 
21 Calmes, Du principe de la confiance légitime en droits allemande, communautaire et français (2001) p 32; 
Solar Century Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWHC 3677 (Admin) 
at [97]; R (Abbassi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 814 at [29] and 
[46] using the terminology of “accrued right”. 
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when it exercises public power, this duty may be trumped by an overriding public interest,22 
and will not apply where there is “bad faith” in the sense of illegality or misconduct of the 
representee,23 or (in most cases) where it has been generated by a mistake of the 
administration.24 Calmes notes that a legitimate expectation occupies the space somewhere 
between an individual interest (exclusively that of trust or expectation) and a subjective right 
(not yet an acquired one). She suggests that it can be considered as a right to the 
foreseeability of changes of the lines of political policy or action, or the right to foreseeability 
of changes to an individual’s own situation.25 Advocate General Trabucchi made it clear that 
a legitimate expectation receives its importance precisely in cases where the interest would 
otherwise not be protected by a subjective right. Droits acquis reflect a certain standard of the 
protection of individual interests in relation to public power, a level of protection that 
legitimate expectations fall short of.26 The concept of legitimate expectation has been 
described both by English and EU commentators as a “principle”, and yet this means 
different things in each legal system: as a general principle of EU law, the protection of 
legitimate expectations can operate to annul secondary EU legislation and national 
legislation; as a principle of English law, legitimate expectations informs the role of the 
courts in reviewing administrative acts.27 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
22 R (Capital Care Services) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1151 at [22]; 
Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de Keuring van Vee en Vlees, ECLI:EU:C:1997:373 at [55] to [59]. 
23 R (Abbassi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 814 at [45] and [46]; 
Case C-492/13 Traum EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia «Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika» Varna 
pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite at [41] and [42]. 
24 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1127B to D; R 
(Capital Care Services) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1151 at [13], [16] to 
[18]. By contrast see Rashid v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744. 
25 Calmes, Du principe de la confiance légitime en droits allemande, communautaire et français (2001). 
26 Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Case 74/74 CNTA v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1975:53. 







B. How are legitimate expectations protected by the courts in English 
law and EU law? 
Having discussed some of the conceptual questions surrounding legitimate expectations, I 
will now consider in more detail the way in which English and EU courts have developed and 
applied the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as found in their respective legal 
systems. This will be used as a basis for the analysis of more recent case law and an 
assessment of how, if at all, external influences have led to changes in the way legitimate 
expectations are protected in either jurisdiction. 
In their development of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, English and 
European courts have identified similar elements which go to the establishment and 
protection of a legitimate expectation. Usually, some kind of representation or undertaking 
made by a public authority to an individual will be necessary: this could be a promise,28 a 
settled practice29 or pre-existing situation,30 or a previously published policy.31 This 
representation should have caused a certain expectation or “justified hope” on the part of the 
individual of a particular outcome or procedure,32 which will then be balanced against any 
overriding public interest to decide whether the expectation should be upheld or denied.33 
While these features form a rough skeleton of the way legitimate expectations are protected 
in both jurisdictions, certain nuances can be found in the way they have been fleshed out by 
national and European courts, which will be described in the following section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
28 R (Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] EWCA Civ 327 at [15] to [24]. 
29 R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755; Case C-373/07 P Mebrom NV v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2009:218. 
30 Case C-168/09 Flos SpA v Semeraro Casa e Famiglia SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2011:29; Case T-415/03 Cofradía de 
pescadores "San Pedro" de Bermeo and Others v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2005:365; Case 
C-310/04 Spain v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:521. 
31 Rashid v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744; Case C-501/11 P Schindler 
Holding Ltd and others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522. 
32 R (Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] EWCA Civ 327 at [47]; Case C-369/09 P ISD Polska sp. z o.o. 
and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:175 at [110]. 
33  R (Capital Care Services) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1151 at [22]; 
Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de Keuring van Vee en Vlees, ECLI:EU:C:1997:373 at [55] to [59]. 
For a recent discussion of overriding public interest in the English Adminsitrative Court, see R (Birks) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 3041 (Admin) at [46], [69] and [73]. 
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I. The protection of legitimate expectations in English law 
1. Historical context 
The protection of legitimate expectations came to be recognised in English public law as a 
way of reviewing the acts of the administration in the second half of the 20th Century. Its 
development by the English courts occurred at much the same time as the European Court of 
Justice was cultivating its own jurisprudence on the protection of legitimate expectations in 
EU law, and also roughly coincided with UK accession to the EU.34 The introduction of the 
principle of legitimate expectations into the English legal order must be understood in the 
context of the nascence of an English administrative law, characterised by the revival of 
principles and remedies that had fallen out of use and a renewed judicial willingness to 
review administrative action.35 
The relatively late development of administrative law in England was a consequence of the 
general antipathy of the courts to judicial review of the use of administrative power. This was 
a result of the prevailing belief in a theory of the separation of powers (as expounded by A V 
Dicey in his influential work Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution)36 that 
sought to wholly exclude the courts from adjudicating on political matters. The dominant 
approach was to allow review of administrative action only if it was outside the powers 
granted to the executive by Parliament (ultra vires) – a consequence also of the belief in a 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty, which designates Parliament as the supreme legal 
authority, which cannot be overridden by the courts or the executive.37 The courts’ fear of 
taking what were essentially political decisions meant that initially they favoured procedural 
rather than substantive standards of review, assessing a decision on the basis of whether 
affected individuals were offered the chance to be heard, or whether there had been any bias 
on the part of the decision-maker. Substantive challenge, that is of the content of the decision 
itself, was confined to a vague standard of “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, which allowed a 
decision-maker to choose from a wide range of possible options, only limited by those which 
were “so unreasonable a reasonable decision-maker would not [choose them]”.38  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
34 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) pp 46 to 48. 
35 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) pp 9 and 26. 
36 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edition, 1959) (first published 1885). 
37 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) p 9. 
38 Associated Provincial Picturehouses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 233. 
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More specifically, the courts’ focus on procedural standards of protection meant a renewed 
application of the judicially developed principles of “natural justice”, encapsulated in the 
Latin maxims audi alteram partem (the right to notice of charge and to a hearing) and nemo 
judex in causa sua (the rule against bias). Particularly relevant for the development of the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations in English law was the right to a hearing, 
revived in the landmark decision Ridge v Baldwin.39 In that case the House of Lords found 
that the restrictions which had previously been placed on the applicability of that right, to 
some extent resulting from the special context of wartime Britain, unnecessarily hindered the 
development of procedural protection.40 The close link between these developments in 
procedural protection and the nascence of a principle of protection of legitimate expectations 
is clear from the first English case to mention “legitimate expectation”.41  In Schmidt v 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Lord Denning noted that notwithstanding the fact that 
the principles of natural justice did not apply to the claimants in question, who were not 
British citizens, an administrative body might nonetheless be bound to give such a person 
affected by a decision of that body, in this case not to extend a person’s permit to stay in the 
country, an opportunity to make representations. Such an obligation would arise, among other 
situations, where a person had a “legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to 
deprive him without hearing what he has to say”.42 
2. Procedural and substantive legitimate expectations 
This early development of an English principle of protection of legitimate expectations, 
offering the right to a hearing where a claimant would otherwise in law not be entitled to one, 
resulted in the creation of an important distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” 
legitimate expectations.43 The difference is characterised by what has been promised by the 
public authority. A procedural legitimate expectation is generated by an assurance that an 
administrative decision will be taken following a particular procedure – in Schmidt, that an 
individual affected by the decision will have the opportunity to present their case. A 
substantive legitimate expectation is generated by an assurance that a particular outcome will 
be reached as a result of the administrative decision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
39 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40. 
40 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, 71 to 78; Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition, 2012) pp 375 to 376. 
41 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) p 50. 
42 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149, 170E to F. 
43 Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition, 2012) p 647. 
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A further distinction was made in the case law on procedural legitimate expectations between 
two situations: those where there is an assurance that a particular procedure will be followed, 
and those where the assurance is of a substantive outcome, but this generates a requirement of 
consultation before any changes are made to the policy. The latter situation has somewhat 
misleadingly been described as a “secondary procedural expectation”.44 In fact, this type of 
expectation is not a true “procedural legitimate expectation” at all, but is rather an 
expectation of a substantive outcome that is being protected by procedural methods.45 
For a long time, English courts resisted any arguments that a substantive legitimate 
expectation could be enforced against the administration, rather than simply giving rise to 
further procedural protection. Allowing substantive legitimate expectations to override the 
freedom of the executive to exercise its discretion was described as “heretical” in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves and as an “obvious and 
unacceptable fetter upon the power, and duty, of a responsible public authority to change its 
policy when it considered that that was required in fulfilment of its public responsibilities” in 
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Richmond London Borough Council.46  
The courts’ unwillingness to recognise substantive legitimate expectations was related to the 
fact that this would inevitably have involved a much higher level of substantive review of 
executive action than that provided by the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness – by 
upholding an expectation of a substantive outcome the court would have approved one 
outcome, rather than simply identifying a range of responses from which the decision-maker 
could choose. However, it has since come to be accepted that a substantive legitimate 
expectation can be protected under English law, although there is some indication that the 
type of legitimate expectation involved may determine the intensity of review to which an 
English court will subject any claimed breach of legitimate expectation.47 The precarious 
place which the protection of substantive legitimate expectations occupies in English law is 
nevertheless evident from the judgment of Lord Carswell in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), who expressed his reluctance to give a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
44 R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [32] and [39]. 
45 R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [33]; R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Richmond London Borough Council [1994] 1 WLR 74 at 92D to 93A. 
46 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906, 921 per Hirst LJ, 
924-925 per Pill LJ; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Richmond London Borough Council [1994] 1 
WLR 74 at 93C. 
47 See Section B.I.2.b) below. 
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concluded opinion on the scope of the protection of substantive legitimate expectations, since 
the issue had not yet been given detailed consideration in the case law of the highest English 
court, the House of Lords.48 
Given the central place of the distinction between procedural and substantive in the 
development of the English courts’ jurisprudence on legitimate expectations, it is noteworthy 
that this has not formed a part of judicial deliberations at EU level. The recognition and 
protection of legitimate expectations by the Luxembourg courts has traditionally been 
substantive: the expectation is that a particular situation will be maintained, or will not be 
changed with retroactive effect, and infringing a legitimate expectation, as a breach of a 
general principle of law, will result in the affected measure being annulled as contrary to EU 
primary law. However, as will be discussed below, recent case law indicates a developing 
practice of the European Court of Justice in protecting legitimate expectations by procedural 
methods, and there has been some judicial support for the recognition of procedural 
legitimate expectations in EU law.49 In this respect it is interesting to note that although 
procedural legitimate expectations are not a distinct entity in German law, the principle of 
legitimate expectations as set out in paragraphs 48 and 49 of the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz does have a procedural character, such that it has been argued 
that the balancing act prescribed in that law is an aspect of German national procedural 
autonomy, which should not have to give way to the EU law principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence.50 
a) The “added value” of a procedural legitimate expectation 
One of the reasons that procedural legitimate expectations have not been widely recognised 
in EU law may be that while they remain in English law as a vestige of the close relationship 
between legitimate expectations and natural fairness, they are simply not necessary. For 
example, one can say that a duty to observe procedural fairness arises because the 
circumstances call for a fair procedure, and to say that the circumstances also lead to a 
legitimate expectation that a fair procedure will be adopted would be superfluous.51 However, 
Craig has demonstrated that at least in English law there is scope for procedural legitimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
48 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61 at [133]. 
49 See Section D.III. below. 
50 Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz als Verfassungsprinzip (2002) pp 484 to 488. 
51 Attorney-General of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 55. See also Cornwall Waste Forum St 
Dennis Branch v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 379 at [36]. 
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expectations to give greater protection than that which can be offered by principles of 
procedural fairness.52 A legitimate expectation might justify according a right to be heard 
where the individual in question is not one who could normally benefit from procedural 
protection, as Lord Denning indicated in Schmidt.53 Even in a situation where an individual 
has some procedural rights, assurances made by a public authority may serve to enhance that 
procedural protection – for example, in Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association, Lord 
Denning held that given the representations made by the city council that the number of 
licensed taxis would not be increased without consulting the applicants, the council’s policy 
on the number of licensed taxis could only be changed “after the most serious consideration” 
and “if satisfied that the public interest requires it”. All the judges agreed that this “most 
serious consideration” meant that representations by affected individuals would have to be 
taken into account.54 
b) The relevance of the procedural/substantive distinction for intensity of review 
The debate in English law as to whether a substantive legitimate expectation could be 
protected by the courts was conclusively settled in R v North and East Devon Health 
Authority, ex parte Coughlan.55 In that case, the Court of Appeal found that a long-term 
disabled person, who had agreed to move from the hospital she was resident in to a care home 
on the assurance that it would be her “home for life”, had a legitimate expectation that 
prevented the health authority from closing that care home and moving her elsewhere. 
Important for present purposes are the three categories of legitimate expectation outlined by 
Lord Woolf: first, cases where a public authority will only be required to bear in mind its 
previous policy or representation, giving it due weight, before it changes course; second, a 
promise or practice that gives rise to a procedural legitimate expectation; and third, a promise 
or practice giving rise to a substantive legitimate expectation. Lord Woolf opined that in the 
first case the conduct of the public authority would only be subjected to a light-touch 
Wednesbury review, in the case of procedural legitimate expectations, the court should 
consider whether the decision-making procedure was fair, and where a substantive legitimate 
expectation had arisen the court should consider whether to frustrate an expectation would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
52 Craig, “Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis” [1992] Law Quarterly Review 79. 
53 This was applied in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629, where the claimant 
was entitled to a hearing as a result of a legitimate expectation, although as an alien he did not benefit from the 
protection of the principles of natural justice. 
54 R v Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299, 308 and 
311 to 313. 
55 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213. 
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so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power, especially considering any possible overriding 
public interest.56  Whether this distinction has been maintained in subsequent cases will be 
discussed in more detail below.57 
c) Distinguishing between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations 
Despite the importance of the difference between procedural and substantive legitimate 
expectations, there is a fine distinction between the two, as demonstrated in R (Bloggs 61) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, where a plea of legitimate expectation was 
changed from substantive to procedural when the applicant appealed against an unfavourable 
decision of the High Court.58 In that case, the applicant, a convicted prisoner, had agreed to 
act as an informant in order to benefit from the protection of a protected witness unit scheme. 
When the applicant was later returned to the general prison population he claimed a 
legitimate expectation that he would remain in the protected witness unit for the duration of 
his sentence, based on assurances made by the police at the time the scheme was offered to 
him. The Court of Appeal considered and rejected the possibility of both a procedural and 
substantive legitimate expectation arising on the facts. The police officers, in presenting the 
scheme, had no authority to bind the Prison Service as to the extent of protection that could 
be offered.59 Regarding the procedural legitimate expectation, the proper procedure had been 
followed when the initial decision was taken to remove the applicant from the protected 
witness unit, and all relevant considerations had been taken into account.60 Difficulties in 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations have led some 
judges to hold that the distinction is confusing or unnecessary,61 but for the moment it 
remains an important aspect of the protection of legitimate expectations in English law. 
3. Knowledge, reliance and consistency of treatment 
Another much-discussed issue in the development of an English jurisprudence on legitimate 
expectations is whether an individual must have “relied” on an assurance before they can 
claim a legitimate expectation – it is commonly expressed as part of the test for a finding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
56 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 at [57] to [58]. 
57 See Section C.IV.1.a) below. 
58 R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [28]. 
59 R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [38] to [44]. 
60 R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [46]. 
61 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Richmond London Borough Council [1994] 1 WLR 74 at 93A; 
R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [69]; R v 
North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 at [59]. 
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legitimate expectation.62 A person relies on a promise or practice of a public authority when 
they act or refrain from acting because of that public authority’s behaviour. Reliance can be 
considered “detrimental” where the individual suffers harm as a result of the trust they placed 
in a pre-existing situation being maintained or a promise being fulfilled.63 
The concept of reliance, which was not part of the test developed by the Court of Justice for 
establishing a legitimate expectation, may have been introduced into the English courts’ 
approach to the protection of legitimate expectations through the influence of the doctrine of 
“estoppel by representation”. Although it is now clear that private law notions of estoppel 
cannot, without more, be applied to public authorities, there is a striking similarity between 
the way an estoppel is established and the test for a legitimate expectation.64 Estoppel by 
representation means that an individual who has made an untrue statement is estopped from 
relying on its falsity if three conditions are met, namely that a precise and unconditional 
(although untrue) statement has been made, that has been communicated to the recipient with 
the knowledge or intention that it will be relied on, and that the recipient has reasonably 
assumed the truth of the statement, and consequently relied on it to her or his financial 
detriment.65 Such a requirement of reliance sets a high burden for the individual invoking the 
legitimate expectation – they must show that they have suffered financially as a result of their 
change in behaviour generated by the expectation that the public authority has caused. 
However, English courts have subsequently tried to distance themselves from the requirement 
that “financial detriment” must be proved, suggesting that in some cases reliance need not be 
detrimental, or that moral detriment might suffice.66 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, there is a close relationship between the state of 
knowledge of the individual and whether they can be said to have relied on a legitimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
62 Office of Fair Trading v Somerfield Stores Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 400 at [30]. For further discussion see 
Elliot, “Legitimate Expectation, Consistency and Abuse of Power: the Rashid Case” [2005] Judicial Review 
281; Forsyth, “Legitimate Expectations Revisited” [2011] Judicial Review 429. 
63 Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) pp 10 to 11. 
64 For example, R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [38] to 
[42]; R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [26] and [55]. 
65 Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 109. 
66 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61 at [73]; R 
(Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [55]. See also United Kingdom 
Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 




expectation.67 Where an individual does not know of the policy or promise upon which the 
claimed legitimate expectation is based, they cannot be said to rely on it – in certain cases, 
this has been determinative for the question of whether a legitimate expectation has arisen. 
The potential unfairness caused in cases where a policy is not applied to an individual who 
did not know of it may be better protected by a principle of consistency or equality of 
treatment.68 
4. Fairness and abuse of power 
Following the liberation of process rights through the abovementioned case Ridge v Baldwin, 
concepts of “fairness” and a “duty to act fairly” began to be imported into the nascent English 
administrative law, mention of which became commonplace in cases involving claims of 
natural justice.69 Craig notes that it was not clear whether natural justice and fairness were 
interchangeable terms, or whether each applied in particular contexts (the former to judicial 
decision-making and the latter to executive or administrative decision-making), and further 
that there was disagreement on extent to which the move to a terminology of “fairness” 
would allow the courts to go further in reviewing administrative action which allegedly 
breached process rights.70 This is reflected in the English courts’ past and continuing 
development of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations: they have defined their 
own jurisdiction to protect legitimate expectations on grounds of fairness, but have not come 
to a clear conclusion as to whether fairness operates as a justification for the protection of 
legitimate expectations,71 a separate ground of review,72 or an overarching category into 
which legitimate expectations could be subsumed.73 The ability of fairness to augment and 
extend categories of judicial review is clear from Sir Thomas Bingham MR’s (as he then 
was) aphoristic statement in R v Inland Revenue ex parte Unilever plc that “[t]he categories 
of unfairness are not closed, and precedent should act as a guide not a cage”.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
67 See Section C.II.1. below. 
68 For the development of such a principle in English law, see R (Kambadzi) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] UKSC 23, more explicitly distinguished from the protection of legitimate expectations by 
the Scottish Inner House of the Court of Session in DM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 
CSIH 29. 
69 Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition, 2012) pp 376 to 377. 
70 Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition, 2012) pp 377 to 378. 
71 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [18]. 
72 R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [70] to [76]. 
73 R (Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust) v Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts [2012] 
EWCA Civ 472 at [15]. 
74 R v Inland Revenue ex parte Unilever plc [1996] STC 681, 690F. 
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Fairness in the protection of legitimate expectations by English courts is closely linked to the 
concept of abuse of power – an often repeated formulation of when a legitimate expectation 
will arise is where there is “unfairness amounting to an abuse of power”.75 Although abuse of 
power has been described as “the root concept which governs and conditions our general 
principles of public law”, judges have also recognised difficulty of translating this first 
principle into a hard legal test and the uncertainty regarding its meaning and application.76  
On one approach, abuse of power and fairness are simply labels applied to a situation in 
which, for other reasons, the court has found an expectation worthy of protection.77 However, 
other cases indicate a wider role for the invocation of fairness and abuse of power in the 
protection of legitimate expectations by English courts. Thus in the case of R v Secretary of 
State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie in the context of administrative 
mistake, Mr Justice Peter Gibson and Mr Justice Laws would – exceptionally – have been 
willing to hold the public authority to its mistake in a case where there was evidence of an 
abuse of power.78 This may have been one reason why the court upheld the legitimate 
expectation in Rashid, discussed below, where the failures of the Home Office were 
described as “startling and prolonged” and without reasonable explanation.79 In other cases, 
notions of fairness have been used to distinguish legitimate expectation from the similar 
private law concept of estoppel.80 Finally, considerations of fairness might allow the courts to 
apply the test of legitimate expectations more flexibly, taking into account considerations 
other than the requirement of a clear and unequivocal assurance, upon which an individual 
may have relied, and the absence of an overriding public interest.81  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
75 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [34]; R (Godfrey) v London Borough 
of Southwark [2012] EWCA Civ 500 at [51]. 
76 Laws LJ in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 
1129F to H. 
77 See Lord Carswell in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] 
UKHL 61 at [135]. 
78 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1127C to F and 
1129F to H. 
79 Rashid v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744 at [13] and [31]. 
80 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [26]; R (Bloggs 61) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 686 at [39]. 
81 For example in Henry Boot Homes the fact that the applicant developers did not avail themselves of legal help 
when they could have done, or of the method available by which they might have been able to achieve 
retrospective authorisation for the works already carried out, were relevant considerations when determining 
whether the public authority’s action was unfair: Henry Boot Homes v Bassetlaw District Council [2002] 
EWCA Civ 983 at [58] and [61]. Similarly in Patel Lloyd Jones LJ noted five further considerations that “go to 
the evaluation of unfairness” which all spoke in favour of finding and upholding the claimed expectation: R 
(Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] EWCA Civ 327 at [84]. 
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The importance of fairness as an explanation and justification for the protection of legitimate 
expectations in English law can be contrasted with its limited relevance in the case law of the 
European courts. Notions of fairness were raised in the early development of the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations in certain opinions given by Advocates General – 
however, these were not adopted or even mentioned by the Court of Justice.82 More recent 
case law has made clear that “fairness” has no supplementary role to play in the European 
courts’ jurisprudence on the protection of legitimate expectations. In cases involving the 
setting of fines for breaches of competition law, the Court of Justice has held that fairness 
cannot operate to restrict the unlimited jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (as it then 
was) in deciding the levels of these fines, even if a legitimate expectation has arisen as a 
result of Commission practice.83 Similarly, in cases where the Commission has tolerated 
irregularities in the past, fairness does not operate so as to give rise to a legitimate 
expectation that this practice will be continued in the future.84 
5. Relief 
In English law, it is at the court’s discretion whether to order any remedy as a result of a 
successful judicial review claim. In principle, the whole array of public law remedies is 
available to a court when deciding how to protect a claim of legitimate expectation. These 
might include injunctions and mandatory orders prohibiting or mandating a certain course of 
action for the administration. They could also include a simple declaration that a legitimate 
expectation has been breached, or that it should be taken into account in future decision-
making, without offering the individual any further remedy for that breach other than saying 
it has occurred.85 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
82 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case 210/87 Remo Padavani v Amministrazione delle finanze dello 
stato, ECLI:EU:C:1988:305 at [19], noting the balance struck by the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations between the “requirements of law and the considerations of equity”; Opinions of Advocate General 
Trabucchi in Case 5/75 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B. J. Stolp v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
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principles of fair dealing and good faith. 
83 Case C-501/11 P Schindler Holding Ltd and others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522 at [164]; 
Case C-70/12 P Quinn Barlo Ltd and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:351 at [57];  Joined 
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84 Case C-199/03 Ireland v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:548 at [68]; Case C-339/00 Ireland v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:545 at [81]. 
85 Craig, Administrative Law (6th edition, 2012) Chapter 25 and p 919. 
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As well as these remedies, which might be considered “substantive” since they seek to give 
effect to the content of the expectation, the court may choose to offer procedural protection of 
the expectation instead. Such procedural protection might take the form of requiring a 
decision-maker to retake the decision, with an explicit instruction to take into account the 
identified legitimate expectation, or could require a decision-maker to consult affected parties 
before taking away a substantive benefit.86 
A significant degree of flexibility is thus characteristic of the courts’ remedial powers where 
the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is breached under English law. This can 
be contrasted with the position where an English court, within its jurisdiction to apply EU 
law, finds that the EU law principle of protection of legitimate expectations has been 
breached. Where the expectation has been breached by the enactment of a new Act of 
Parliament, the court is obliged to disapply the conflicting English legislation,87 although in 
the case of Acts of Parliament the courts do not have the power to annul these. The English 
courts have abided by this rigid approach, refusing to introduce elements of the remedial 
flexibility available to them under English law. Even where disapplication leaves a gap in the 
legal provisions governing a particular area, the courts have left it to Parliament or the 
executive to put transitional measures in place.88 
II. The protection of legitimate expectations in EU law 
The protection of legitimate expectations in EU law was developed by the Court of Justice in 
response to issues raised in preliminary references brought before it, and through the 
recognition of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations as general 
principles of EU law.89 The principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations were not, 
and have not since been given any written expression in the Treaties.90 As a general principle 
of EU law, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations has a superior status as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
86 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 60 at [67]; R (Luton Borough Council) v 
Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin) at [122] and [126]. 
87 Fleming (trading as Bodycraft) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2008] UKHL 2 at [22] per Lord 
Scott of Foscote, [24] per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. 
88 Fleming (trading as Bodycraft) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2008] UKHL 2 at [77] per Lord 
Carswell, [104] per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury. 
89 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (revised 1st edition, 2006) pp 941 to 942; Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz 
als Verfassungsprinzip (2002) p 393. 
90 Jacqué, Droit institutionnel de L'Union Européenne (6th edition, 2010) at [826]. The principle of non-
retroactivity has now been given expression in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – see 
Articles 41 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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“constitutional” principle, which means that it can be used to challenge and potentially annul 
EU and national legislation. 
The origins of the protection of legitimate expectations in European Community law (as it 
then was) can be traced to the German principle of Vertrauensschutz (protection of trust). In 
the mid-20th Century the only European countries with a developed approach to the 
protection of legitimate expectations were Germany and the Netherlands.91 In the early cases 
of Hoogovens92 and Lemmerz-Werke93 the Advocates General focussed on its German 
provenance when raising the issue of protecting legitimate expectations, something that was 
explicitly recognised by the court in the latter case.94 However, although inspired by the 
principle of Vertrauensschutz, the Court of Justice has been unwilling to protect individual 
expectations to quite the same extent as the approach under German law.95 
The development of the protection of legitimate expectations by the Court of Justice has 
differed according to the context, both in terms of the subject matter with regard to which 
such expectations can arise and the types of action which they can be used to challenge.96 
With regard to the latter, it is possible to identify three rough categories of action: legislative 
measures with actual or apparent retroactivity; revocation of individual acts; and the conduct 
of European institutions.97 An example of context-specific rules on legitimate expectation are 
those related to the recovery of unlawful State aids by national courts after a decision on 
incompatibility has been issued by the Commission. The ability to invoke legitimate 
expectations in this context has been strictly circumscribed by the Court, in order to prevent 
the system for monitoring and approving State aids from being undermined.98 Similarly, the 
Court has been less willing to recognise the creation of legitimate expectations in the context 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, where the Court takes the approach that individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
91 Von Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (2008) p 574; Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz als 
Verfassungsprinzip (2002) pp 393 to 394. 
92 Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1962:28. 
93 Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority of the ECSC, ECLI:EU:C:1965:76. 
94 Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority of the ECSC, ECLI:EU:C:1965:76 at 691. This was the 
first case in which the Court of Justice explicitly recognised the protection of legitimate expectations as part of 
the EU legal order. 
95 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) p 42 and fn 7. 
96 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (revised 1st edition, 2006) pp 942 to 946; Schwarz, Vertrauensschutz 
als Verfassungsprinzip (2002) pp 391 to 392; Crones, Selbstbindungen der Verwaltung im Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrecht (1996) pp 111 to 112. 
97 I borrow these from Hofmann et al: Hofmann, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union (2011) pp 178 to 190. 
98 Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (2nd edition, 2006) p 296. 
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should be aware of the need for flexible policy-making to cope with the fluctuations in the 
market.99 
The way that the Court’s approach has developed, and the fact that the Court has been 
unwilling to provide a theoretical justification for the protection of legitimate expectations,100 
make it difficult to identify one particular “test” by which a legitimate expectation can be 
established under EU law. However, certain general rules can be identified which the Court 
applies in each type of case, although it appears to apply them more or less strictly depending 
on the context.101 
Regarding legitimate expectations generated by individualised representations made by EU 
institutions, a general formulation as expressed in the case Branco v Commission has been 
that “precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and 
reliable sources” must have been given to the person claiming to have a legitimate 
expectation, which “give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the person to whom 
they are addressed” and “comply with the applicable rules”.102 There must also be no 
overriding reasons in the public interest why the legitimate expectation should be defeated.103 
Legislation with actual or apparent retroactivity and the revocation of lawful acts are not 
precluded so long as there has been proper respect for legitimate expectations, which seems 
to require taking any expectations into account when deciding whether to pass retroactive 
legislation or to revoke an act, perhaps by introducing transitional measures.104 In the 
following sections, certain features of the way in which legitimate expectations are protected 
by the EU courts will be examined in more detail. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
99 Case C-310/04 Spain v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:521 at [81]; Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, EU:C:2013:834 at [47]; Craig, EU Administrative 
Law (2nd edition, 2012) p 574. 
100 Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000) p 44. 
101 Schwarze, European Administrative Law (revised 1st edition, 2006) p 943; Hoffman, Rowe and Türk, 
Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (2011) pp 178 to 190. 
102 Case T-347/03 Branco v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2005:265 at [102]. 
103 Case 74/74 CNTA SA v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1976:84 at [43]. 
104 Case C-98/14 Berlington Hungary Tanácsadó és Szolgáltató kft and others v Magyar Állam at [83] to [85]; 
Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 
EU:C:2013:834 at [47]; Hofmann, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union 
(2011) p 183. 
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1. The state of knowledge of the individual harbouring the legitimate expectation: the prudent 
trader 
In EU law, the state of knowledge of the individual claiming the benefit of the legitimate 
expectation is described by the expression “the prudent trader”. Thus even if the assurance is 
precise and specific, a legitimate expectation can be defeated if the conduct complained of 
could have been foreseen by a “prudent and circumspect trader”.105 Importantly, the trader 
must be legally as well as factually well-informed, which normally means that a prudent 
trader should have sought legal advice, and that they are assumed to be aware of the law, for 
example as it is published in the Official Journal.106 The foreseeability of legislative or policy 
change, as well as the level of knowledge a “prudent trader” is expected to have, are high 
hurdles for any potential claimant to overcome. For example, in Lührs, where two measures 
changing the tax regime for exportation of potatoes were introduced due to a very poor potato 
harvest in 1975, the mere existence of similar earlier measures, adopted by the Community 
and in some Member States, was enough to render it foreseeable that the challenged measures 
would be put in place.107 In Delacre, the Court held that downward trends in butter stock 
levels over the course of two years and the resulting increase of the price of butter implied 
that it was inevitable that the availability of Community aid for butter would decrease, such 
that the applicants could not have a legitimate expectation that such aid would remain at the 
same levels indefinitely.108  
Within this test for the state of knowledge of the individual there are tensions between the 
objective and subjective elements. Considering a hypothetical individual such as “the prudent 
trader” strongly implies an objective approach – the Court of Justice imbues this figure with 
the characteristics and knowledge they consider relevant, and uses it as a standard against 
which to compare the behaviour of actual individual claiming the expectation. This objective 
approach is most obvious in the context of State aid cases, where the opportunities for 
upholding an alleged legitimate expectation have been strictly circumscribed by the Court, to 
prevent the prescriptive EU laws on State aid from being undermined. For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
105 Joined cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport v Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:443 at [70]; Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edition, 2012) pp 567 to 572; Schwarze, 
European Administrative Law (revised 1st edition, 2006) p 952. 
106 Case C-80/89 Erwin Behn Verpackungsbedarf GmbH v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, ECLI:EU:C:1990:269 at [13]; 
Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edition, 2012) p 571. 
107 Case 78/77 Lührs v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, ECLI:EU:C:1978:20 at [6]. 
108 Case C-350/88 Société française des Biscuits Delacre e.a. v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:71 at [37]. 
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regardless of whether the individual knows of it, a Member State’s failure to notify any 
measure that is subsequently found to constitute State aid will normally be enough to 
completely exclude the application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. A 
prudent trader is one who would have suspected that the measure they have benefited from is 
one which could constitute State aid, and would accordingly have made inquiries as to 
whether the measure has been notified.109 However, as Schonberg notes, in some cases the 
Court has taken subjective considerations into account, such as the actual state of knowledge 
of the claimant, in order to deny the existence of a legitimate expectation.110 As will be seen 
below, the Court has continued to adopt this approach in some of its more recent 
jurisprudence.111 
2. The state of knowledge of the individual harbouring the legitimate expectation: the concept 
of reliance 
Reliance takes a much smaller role in the protection of legitimate expectations by EU courts 
than in corresponding cases heard by the English courts. This is clear at the outset from the 
test way in which the Court of Justice applies to determine the existence of a legitimate 
expectation. The test cited above applied by the Court in Branco, which simply refers to 
precise and unconditional assurances originating from authorised and reliable sources, is 
reiterated in the more recent case of Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission: the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations “extends to any individual who is in a situation in which 
it is clear that the European Union authorities have, by giving him precise assurances, led him 
to entertain legitimate expectations”.112 In order to engage the protection of the legitimate 
expectations regime, an individual must simply have expected something as a result of an 
authorised, sufficiently precise assurance – it is not necessary for them to prove that they 
suffered some financial detriment as a result of the expectation, or even that they acted on the 
assurance or changed their behaviour as a result of it. 
Reliance has some role to play in EU law – it will necessarily be taken into account by the 
European courts if relief is sought via a claim that a Member State or Union institution acted 
in breach of EU law, as the individual claiming the expectation will need to establish a causal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
109 Joined cases C-183/02 P and C-187/02 P Daewoo Electronics Manufacturing España SA (Demesa) v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:701 at [44] and [45]; Case C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:163 at [25]. 
110 Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 125. 
111 See Section D.II.1. below. 
112 Case T-554/08 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:194 at [51]. 
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link between the breach of the expectation and a loss that they have suffered. Schonberg has 
also argued that reliance will be an important consideration for the EU Courts’ balancing of 
public and private interests when deciding whether a legitimate expectation should be 
upheld.113 However, since claims of a legitimate expectation are often denied on the basis of 
a lack of sufficiently precise assurances on the part of the administration, and the court has 
rarely undertaken this balancing exercise explicitly,114 the concept of reliance has received 
scarce treatment by the Court of Justice. 
3. The relationship between the individual harbouring the legitimate expectation and the 
public authority generating it: foreseeability and discretion 
One of the most important elements of the approach of the Court of Justice to the protection 
of legitimate expectations is the foreseeability of the institutional conduct which, it is 
claimed, is in breach of a legitimate expectation. If such conduct could have been foreseen by 
the Court’s hypothetical “prudent trader”, there is no scope for the operation of the principle 
of protection of legitimate expectations.115 The courts’ treatment of this requirement of 
foreseeability in conjunction with its discussion of the discretionary power of EU institutions 
gives a good indication of how it views the relationship between the individual claiming the 
legitimate expectation and the public authority against which it is claimed. Where EU 
institutions or Member States are given large areas of discretion under EU law, a legislative 
amendment adopted through the exercise of that discretion cannot be considered 
unforeseeable, and thus no legitimate expectation can arise.116 
This approach contrasts with the general position of the English courts on the role of 
legitimate expectations in the relationship between the administration and the individual. 
Legitimate expectations arise precisely where an area of discretion has been granted to a 
public authority by the legislature – a representation made by such an authority, whether in 
the form of an individualised assurance or a communicated policy – informs the courts’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
113 Hoffman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (2011) p 178; Schonberg, 
Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) p 129. 
114 For an interpretation of cases decided by the Court of Justice which suggests that this balancing exercise is 
carried out tacitly, see Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) pp 129 to 131. 
115 Joined cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport v Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:443 at [70]. 
116 See the classic statement in Joined cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport v Ministero del 
Commercio con l'Estero, ECLI:EU:C:2004:443 at [70], often repeated in subsequent cases; see also Case C-
201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539 at [54] and Case C-
496/08 P Pilar Angé Serrano and Others v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:2010:116 at [93] applying the 
principle to Member States and to the Union legislature respectively. 
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assessment of how such a discretion should be exercised. For example, it was implicitly 
accepted in Begbie that the legitimate expectation contended for could have bound the 
Secretary of State, if it had not been in conflict with the statutory purpose for which the 
discretion in question had been granted.117 
4. The power to make a binding representation – ultra vires representations and binding 
others 
There are two facets to the power of an EU institution or a Member State to make a 
representation that will be capable of generating a binding legitimate expectation: one relates 
to the scope that the representation can cover, and the other to the identity of the institutions 
that a public authority can bind by such a representation. 
Similarly to their English counterparts,118 the EU Courts have adopted a strict approach to the 
extent to which a precise assurance can have binding effects for the public authority and an 
even stricter approach to whom a public authority is able to bind by the assurances they 
make. Under EU law an assurance made outside the power of the Member State or Union 
institution who makes it cannot generate a legitimate expectation.119 This approach has been 
confirmed in recent case law of the Court of Justice,120 and contrasts with the willingness of 
the English courts to deal with the issue of representations made outside the scope of the 
authority’s powers slightly more flexibly, mainly due the influence of the Human Rights Act 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as discussed below.121 
The EU courts have also taken a strict approach to the question of whom a representation will 
be held to bind. Representations made by Member States or national authorities within them 
cannot be binding on Union institutions – if this were possible, Member States could take 
advantage of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations to alter the balance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
117 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1125F, 1129E 
and 1130B-H. 
118 See Section C.III.1. below. 
119 Schonberg notes that a very limited exception to this principle operates in cases concerning fines imposed by 
the Commission on companies for violations of EC law, where “specific and misleading assurances made by 
Commission officials may lead to the mitigation of such fines”: Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in 
Administrative Law (2000) p 148, referring to Case 188/82 Thyssen AG v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1983:329. 
120 Case C-568/11 Agroferm A/S v Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri, ECLI:EU:C:2013:407 at 
[56]; Case C-369/09 P ISD Polska sp. z o.o. and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:175 at 
[123]; Case C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2006:287 at [67] to [69]. 
121 See Section C.III.1.a) below. 
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powers and division of competences set out in the Treaties.122 The requirement that legitimate 
expectation must come from an “authorised and reliable source” is also interpreted strictly 
within the Union institutions: an assurance made by an individual Director-General will 
normally not bind the Commission.123 The Court of Justice has further held that in the context 
of setting fines for breaches of EU competition law, Commission practice or guidelines 
cannot bind the General Court or the European Court of Justice when it comes to review such 
fines – although this may be a consequence of explicit provisions stating that the EU Courts 
have unlimited jurisdiction to decide the level of such fines.124 
5. Relief 
In the rare case that a legitimate expectation is upheld by the EU courts, the remedies 
available are different to those which can be offered by the English courts. In the first 
instance, breach of a legitimate expectation under EU law would result in a challenged piece 
of secondary legislation or administrative being struck down as invalid. Breach of a 
legitimate expectation can also give rise to a claim for damages if it is a sufficiently serious 
breach to ground either Member State liability under the Brasserie du Pecheur and 
Francovich rules or non-contractual liability of the Union under Article 340 TFEU.125 Once 
the requirements for such a claim are made out, the court does not have any discretion to 
refuse it, although some flexibility may be imported through the test of whether breach of 
legitimate expectation constitutes such a sufficiently serious breach as to justify an award of 
damages. Nevertheless, and by contrast with the wide discretion the English courts have to 
order relief for breaches of administrative law, the remedial options available to the 
Luxembourg courts are strict and rigid. 
III. Conclusion 
A number of differences between the protection of legitimate expectations as initially 
developed by the EU and English courts can thus be identified. These include: the scope of 
the operation of the principle, in particular which types of EU, State and public authority acts 
it can be used to review and annul; the distinction or lack thereof between procedural and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
122 Case C-148/04 Unicredito Italiano SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate, Ufficio Genova 1, ECLI:EU:C:2005:774 at 
[107]. 
123 Hoffman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (2011) p 188 and cases 
referenced therein. 
124 Case C-70/12 P Quinn Barlo Ltd and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:351 at [52] and 
[53]. 
125 Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1990:259 at [24] to [32]; Case 74/74 CNTA SA 
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substantive legitimate expectations; the relevance of concepts such as reliance and 
foreseeability; and the nature of any relief available. These differences will inform the more 





C. Recent case law of the English courts 
I. Introduction 
In the following section, recent case law of the English courts on legitimate expectations is 
analysed and compared, in order to assess whether and how this jurisprudence has been 
affected by the influence of European law. Comparisons are made between cases where EU 
law has some relevance for the case to those involving purely domestic situations. In this 
analysis, recurring themes can be identified, which pertain to the three actors involved in the 
relationship generated by a legitimate expectation – the individual claiming the expectation, 
the public authority giving the assurance that generated it, and the court which is called on to 
enforce the expectation. 
1. Scope and case selection 
The cases have been selected by searching first for any case in which a claim of legitimate 
expectation has been raised before an English court. These cases have then been divided 
according to whether a provision or principle of EU law has been raised in the case or not. 
EU law has a range of applications in those cases where it is mentioned: this could range 
from an obligation on the court to apply an EU principle of legitimate expectations126 to an 
incidental relevance where an obligation under EU law, such as the notification of technical 
regulations, furnishes another ground of review.127 
Since there are a much larger number of cases on legitimate expectation where where EU law 
has no relevance, for this category the analysis has been limited to cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, its predecessor the House of Lords, and the Court of Appeal, which together 
make up the highest English courts. 
The analysis is also limited to only those cases decided after 2000. Two detailed comparative 
studies on legitimate expectations in English and EU law were undertaken before 2000:128 it 
will be interesting to consider more recent case law in the context of those findings, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
126 United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs [2013] EWHC 1959 (Admin); Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2012] UKSC 19. 
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closer integration of the European Union culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Furthermore, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Coughlan, handed down in July 1999, 
represented a significant watershed in the protection of legitimate expectations by English 
courts.129  
2. When are English courts under an obligation to apply the EU principle of legitimate 
expectations? 
Since the discussion that follows will compare the approach of English courts in cases 
involving EU law and English law, it is important to clarify when English courts will be 
under an obligation to apply the EU law principle of legitimate expectations, in place of the 
domestic one. Although it is difficult to give a general definition of when cases will fall 
within the scope of EU law, thereby obliging national courts to apply EU legal principles,130 a 
number of specific situations can be identified where EU law will apply. These include: when 
a directly enforceable EU law right is at stake;131 when the administration is exercising a 
discretion given to them under EU law132 or is implementing a directive or other EU 
legislation;133 and when the administration exercises a right to derogate from EU law.134 
It is worth noting here that the approach of the Court of Justice has been that in situations 
where national courts are required to apply the EU principle of legitimate expectations, the 
scope of protection should be limited to what is offered under EU law.135 By contrast, English 
courts have seen their jurisdiction in cases involving EU law issues as more wide-ranging, 
drawing on aspects of the protection of legitimate expectations in both jurisdictions.136 
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II. The individual harbouring the expectation – the applicant for judicial review 
Two main themes in the case law pertain to the position of the individual harbouring the 
expectation; these can have important consequences for whether an expectation is found and 
is upheld. The first concerns the individual’s state of knowledge, while the second concerns 
the relevance of reliance, detrimental or otherwise, for a finding of legitimate expectation.  
1. The state of knowledge of the individual 
A recurring theme in the case law on legitimate expectations is the effect that the knowledge 
that an individual has or can be assumed to have has on their ability to establish a claim of 
legitimate expectation. This can be compared with the role of the concept of the “prudent 
trader” in EU law, and the extent to which the notion of foreseeability can be used to defeat a 
legitimate expectation. Although English courts have been less explicit than their EU 
counterparts in discussing the state of knowledge of the individual, it is nevertheless a 
relevant factor in many decisions of the former in the context of legitimate expectations.  
a) Cases decided by English courts where there is no connection with EU law 
Two different approaches can be identified regarding the individual’s state of knowledge in 
cases heard by the English courts where there is no connection with EU law. In some cases, 
the courts have not considered the actual knowledge of the individual, but rather adopted an 
objective approach much like the European courts’ prudent trader, assuming that the 
individual does or should have a certain state of knowledge, as a member of a particular 
group. By contrast, in other cases the information actually in the mind of the individual 
claiming the legitimate expectation has been given weight by English judges. 
When applying the first approach, English courts been prepared to assume that an individual 
has a certain state of knowledge, even where this has not been convincingly proven on the 
facts. Examples include R (Davies and another) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners;137 R 
(Capital Care Services) v Secretary of State for the Home Department138 and Begum and 
others v Returning Officer for London Borough of Tower Hamlets.139 Davies concerned the 
interpretation of a provision of guidance issued by the Inland Revenue on the meaning of 
“residence” for tax purposes. The case was only concerned with what representation, if any, 
was contained in the guidance – it was accepted by both sides that if a representation was 
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made out, this would give rise to a legitimate expectation.140 In determining the content of 
any representation made in the guidance, Lord Wilson JSC (with whom Lord Hope, Lord 
Walker and Lord Clarke JJSC agreed) considered how the “ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer” 
would have understood the guidance. On Lord Wilson JSC’s interpretation the contents of the 
guidance were unlikely to have come as a surprise to such an individual.141 Rather than taking 
into account what Mr Davies and the other appellants in the appeal had actually believed or 
expected, Lord Wilson JSC based his judgment on what a fictitious person with a certain 
level of “sophistication” would have understood. This led to a finding that the representation 
contained in the guidance was not the one contended for by the appellants, and their claim of 
legitimate expectation failed.   
In Capital Care Services and Begum, factors that an appellant knew or should have known 
were relevant considerations for determining whether a legitimate expectation was present on 
the facts. Capital Care Services was an appeal of a decision refusing permission for judicial 
review in the immigration law context. The appellants contended that the revocation of their 
licence to operate as a sponsor for immigrant workers coming to the United Kingdom 
breached their legitimate expectation arising from guidance issued by the Secretary of State 
when the appellants applied for their licence. In rejecting the appeal, a relevant factor was 
that the appellants knew or must have been taken to know the relevant policy and changes to 
the guidance. Although ultimately the expectation was based on a mistaken misrepresentation 
by the Secretary of State, contravening his responsibility to apply his own policy correctly, 
the applicants also had to share some of the responsibility, given that they were to be treated 
as having known the policy and the guidance.142 
The applicants in Begum were prospective candidates at a local election – they contended that 
they had a legitimate expectation that their nomination papers would be checked by the 
returning officer before the deadline for nominations, and that the failure to do so (due to an 
administrative mistake) prevented them from standing for election. Breach of legitimate 
expectation was found in the High Court, but the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal brought 
by the returning officer, overturning this decision. A relevant factor was that the nominees 
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and their representatives had failed to fill in the forms correctly, despite receiving explicit 
advice from the deputy returning officer. 
By contrast, the second approach can be seen in Lord Mance JSC’s dissenting judgment in 
Davies, following the statement of Lord Justice Dyson in R (Association of British Civilian 
Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence that “the question is how on a 
fair reading of the promise it would have been reasonably understood by those to whom it 
was made.”143 While this approach still requires some objective assessment through the 
concept of “reasonableness”, its focus is on the individual in question, rather than any 
member of the group to which they belong (in Davies the “ordinary taxpayers” as identified 
by Lord Wilson JSC. The relevance of the difference in approach becomes clear when it is 
applied to the facts of the case. Lord Mance JSC found that “the guidance is meant to reflect 
‘the law and practice’, and … it was and is intended to obviate any need for a taxpayer to 
look further”.144 Thus it was “wrong to assume a knowledge of the case law as a background 
to the construction of the guidance”, especially as taxpayers’ professional advisers would be 
very likely to be (as in the case of the appellants) accountants rather than lawyers.145 This led 
him to the conclusion that the interpretation contended for by the appellants was the correct 
one, and that the legitimate expectation should thus be upheld. 
b) Cases decided by English courts where there is a connection with EU law 
In cases decided by English courts with a direct or indirect connection with EU law, the 
court’s reasoning has usually been expressed in terms borrowed from the European courts: it 
considers how a prudent, normally informed businessman, or normally diligent taxpayer in 
the applicant’s situation would have acted.146 Following the approach of the European courts, 
this normally requires the applicant to have taken legal advice: in Test Claimants in the FII 
Group v Revenue and Customs Commissioners,147 Lord Sumption JSC referred to the “well-
advised” person in the claimant’s position, while in R (Sovio Wines Ltd) v Food Standards 
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Agency (Wine Standards Branch) Mr Justice Dobbs considered that in the situation before 
him a prudent business would have taken legal advice.148 
The requirement to be well-advised notwithstanding, it seems that English courts take a less 
strict approach to the standard of knowledge and extent of foresight expected of a prudent 
trader than their European counterparts. This is clear in Azam & Co v Legal Services 
Commission,149 a case concerning a failure by the Legal Services Commission to expressly 
identify in a letter to the applicant solicitors’ firm the deadline for submitting a tender for 
immigration work, which the applicant contended was in breach of its legitimate expectation. 
The public procurement process in this case was wholly governed by EU law, although the 
court did not make any mention of the relevance of this for its application of the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations. Regarding the behaviour expected of the individual 
claiming the legitimate expectation, Mr Justice Briggs was: “not persuaded that the obligation 
on a person relying on a legitimate expectation to exercise reasonable care and diligence 
necessarily required solicitors in the position of [the applicant] to study the consultation 
process in detail”. The circumstances in which the judge did find that a reasonably and 
carefully diligent solicitor could not have entertained a legitimate expectation were where a 
letter sent by the Legal Services Commission was stated in unambiguous terms, clearly 
referred the reader to sources of further information, and whose final statement was 
irreconcilable with the expectation relied on by the applicant.150 The decision of Mr Justice 
Briggs was affirmed on appeal, although the argument on legitimate expectation was rejected 
in stronger terms by Lord Justice Pill, who was “entirely unimpressed by it”.151 
A good example of possible different approaches to the state of knowledge expected of an 
individual claiming a legitimate expectation is the case Test Claimants in the FII Group. In 
this case, the Supreme Court had to consider two legislative provisions (section 320 of the 
Finance Act 2004, and section 107 of the Finance Act 2007) which curtailed the limitation 
period for restitution of payments based on a mistake. EU law was engaged because the 
restitutionary claim arose from the fact that the tax in question, advance corporation tax, had 
been found to give rise to an unjustified difference of treatment contrary to the freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital provisions at that time enshrined in Articles 43 
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and 56 of the EC Treaty. Although the seven justices on the bench all purported to apply the 
test of legitimate expectations under EU law, they interpreted the requirements of that test in 
different ways, and ultimately this difference in interpretation meant that a reference to the 
European Court of Justice was required. 
In his dissenting opinion, Lord Sumption JSC emphasised that the right to restitution claimed 
by the Claimants had only been recognised in English law for seven weeks before Parliament 
legislated in section 320 of the 2004 Act to curtail the limitation period for such restitution 
claims.152 Given the fact that the finding of such a claim by a first instance court was virtually 
certain to be appealed, and that the outcome of any appeal was uncertain, it could not be said 
that such an unequivocal state of affairs was present that a reasonable person could have 
made plans based on it.153 By contrast, the majority (whose approach was confirmed by the 
Court of Justice) effectively found that as soon as a right to a restitutionary payment arose, 
the principle of legitimate expectations (as an element of the principle of effectiveness) was 
engaged and prevented the limitation period for such a right from being curtailed without a 
reasonable transitional period.154 
When analysing the circumstances in which the right to restitution arose and the enactment of 
section 320, Lord Sumption adopted a more subjective approach to legitimate expectation; 
the existence of an expectation should be based on the state of knowledge of a well-advised 
person in the claimants’ position. Agreeing with Lord Sumption, Lord Brown posited that on 
the facts of the case no legitimate expectation could be made out.155 The majority and the 
Court of Justice however applied a more objective and abstract approach to legitimate 
expectation; once the possibility of a restitutionary claim had been recognised by a court, a 
transitional period is required even where it might reasonably have been said that due to the 
uncertainty of the legal position a person should not have been entitled to rely on such a 
possible claim. The legitimate expectation was thus detached from the actual circumstances 
of the case. 
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In Corkteck Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners156 the court’s decision to reject the 
legitimate expectation was based both on an objective and subjective consideration of the 
state of knowledge of the applicant undertaking. The expectation was claimed on the basis of 
advice allegedly given during a brief telephone call with the National Advisory Service for 
tax matters; the tax in the case, value added tax, was then and is still governed by EU law, 
and Mr Malde, Corkteck’s director, had asked for advice in relation to the taxation of 
shipments of soft drinks to a trader in Poland. Mr Justice Sales first concluded that certain 
circumstances of the case, such as the length of the telephone call and the fact that the 
National Advisory Service only held itself out as a source of “general advice”, meant that it 
would not have been reasonable to rely on the advice given during the phone call as a 
foundation for the view that the rules on VAT would be applied by the Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners in a certain way. The judge then found this to be reinforced by the facts that 
were in the mind of Mr Malde at the time of the phone call – he would have been aware of 
the terms of the Commissioners’ notice that conflicted with the advice he had allegedly been 
given, and of the facts of his employment relationship with the trader in Poland which also 
contradicted the legitimate expectation that he claimed.157 By considering the reality of Mr 
Malde’s state of mind to reinforce his conclusions, Mr Justice Sales thus distanced himself 
from the concept of the hypothetical prudent trader. 
In contradistinction with the decisions discussed above, where a more subjective and less 
strict view was taken as to the state of knowledge of the individual claiming the legitimate 
expectation, in Solar Century Holdings v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change158 Mr Justice Green adopted an approach that was very much in concordance with 
that of the Court of Justice. Although EU law only incidentally relevant for the case, as the 
challenged policy was said to be part of the government’s long-term strategy to comply with 
its obligations in relation to renewable sources of energy under Directive 2009/28/EEC,159 
there is a striking similarity between the situation in Solar Century Holdings and the facts 
giving rise to the preliminary reference in Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
156 Corkteck Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 785 (Admin). 
157 Corkteck Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 785 (Admin) at [31]. 
158 Solar Century Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWHC 3677 
(Admin). 
159 Solar Century Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWHC 3677 
(Admin) at [16]. 
35	  
	  
Darmstadt,160 discussed in more detail below. In Solar Century Holdings the applicant 
claimed that the premature withdrawal of a scheme subsidising certain renewable energies 
was in breach of their legitimate expectation. In finding that no expectation arose on the facts, 
Mr Justice Green held that the limits imposed on the scheme in a control framework 
published in 2011 and described in argument by the defendant as an “ever-present and all 
pervasive”161 feature of the scheme were “a systemic risk which all operators must be taken 
to have accepted”.162 Rather than considering what the applicant in question knew or 
believed, Mr Justice Green thus took an objective view of situation that all operators 
benefiting from the scheme were in, and what one of those operators was entitled to expect in 
relation to its continuance. 
c) Some conclusions 
The above analysis indicates that there are some differences in the English and EU courts’ 
approach with regard to the state of knowledge of the individual claiming a legitimate 
expectation. In both cases falling within and outside the scope of EU law, some English 
judges appear to have taken a more flexible approach take into account an individual’s 
personal characteristics, for example by considering how a statement made by a public 
authority might have reasonably been understood by the individual to whom it was made, 
rather than the class of persons to whom the individual belongs.163 Although English courts 
have adopted the EU terminology of the “prudent and discerning trader” when discussing 
cases involving EU law issues, they still appear to be applying this requirement more 
liberally than the European courts. 
This difference in approach may be connected to the nature of the litigants bringing cases 
before the respective courts. Schonberg notes that “the notion of foreseeability is extremely 
important in EC law, because most litigants are professional traders and civil servants, and 
both of these groups may be expected to show considerable diligence in their dealings with 
the administration”. This leads to a very strict view of what these litigants should know and 
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be able to foresee.164 This can be contrasted with cases before national courts, where litigants 
are far more likely to be individuals whose personal or working lives have been affected in 
some way by a government’s change of policy or failure to honour a promise. Nevertheless, 
as Schonberg argues, not all litigants bringing EU law cases will be large corporations – some 
will be smaller enterprises without the resources to keep as abreast of current developments 
as the model prudent trader might do. A clear example is the solicitors’ firm in Azam, whose 
income came largely from public contracts.165 
More recent cases such as Davies, Capital Care Services and Solar Century Holdings do 
however furnish some evidence of English courts adopting a more objective approach to the 
protection of legitimate expectations. Given the similarities between the factual situations in 
Solar Century Holdings and Plantanol, and the fact that English tax law is increasingly 
subject to European regulation, this may well be the result of the influence of the case law of 
the Luxembourg courts. 
2. The relevance of reliance 
a) Reliance as applied by the English courts in purely domestic cases 
Although as noted above reliance has always been recognised as an important part of the 
courts’ discussion of legitimate expectations, there is a long-standing debate as to whether 
reliance is a pre-requisite for establishing a legitimate expectation. Two lines of case law on 
reliance can be identified in the recent case law. One characterises reliance as an essential 
part of the test for legitimate expectations.166 The other approach treats lack of reliance as a 
relevant consideration – something that can be taken into account when determining the 
existence of a legitimate expectation, the absence of which is not however fatal for such an 
expectation.167  
The focus on reliance as an essential element for establishing a legitimate expectation is 
related to an argument that where the individual in question is unaware of the policy or 
assurance upon which the expectation is based they cannot be said to expect any procedure or 
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outcome. Where there is a lack of knowledge of a representation, there is necessarily no 
reliance. In R (Abbassi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the fact that 
the applicants did not know of the existence of the policy was one element in deciding that 
there could be no legitimate expectation, precisely because this meant that there could not 
have been any reliance (although Lord Justice Stanley Burton, with whom the rest of the 
court agreed, did not go so far as to say that the concept of legitimate expectation could never 
be applied in cases where those claiming such an expectation are not aware of any 
representation).168 Lord Justice Peter Gibson similarly emphasised the importance of reliance 
in Begbie, stating that he was unable to “accept that the mere fact that a clear and unequivocal 
statement such as that made [in these circumstances] is enough to establish a legitimate 
expectation … such that the expectation cannot be allowed to be defeated”.169 Something 
more, namely reliance to the applicant’s possible detriment, was necessary.170  
However, even in Abbassi the court was unwilling to hold that reliance was an essential 
element in every situation in which a legitimate expectation would be upheld, and it is 
arguable that in Begbie Lord Justice Peter Gibson’s view misrepresented the English 
principle of legitimate expectations. His implication was that a requirement for detrimental 
reliance would be the only way to prevent a clear and unequivocal statement that generates an 
expectation from being upheld in all circumstances. This appears to ignore the fact that such 
an expectation could nevertheless be validly breached where an overriding public interest 
justified doing so. 
A more moderate and nuanced approach that can be found in some of the cases treats 
reliance, detrimental or otherwise, as a relevant consideration for establishing a legitimate 
expectation, rather than as an essential element without which a legitimate expectation claim 
will fail. This is most clearly expressed in R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council, 
which describes the presence or absence of reliance as a factual, rather than a legal 
consideration.171 In that case, the applicants, who were refugees, were found to have relied on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
168 R (Abbassi and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 814 at [43]. 
169 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1127B. 
170 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1126E to 
1127A. 
171 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [31]. This approach was approved by 
Laws LJ giving the sole judgment in R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [70]. 
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the expectation of a secure tenancy generated by the local authority’s mistaken view of the 
legal position at the time, although they had suffered no financial detriment as a result.172 
The importance attached to reliance as an element of the test for establishing a legitimate 
expectation may also depend on the context in which the legitimate expectation is claimed. 
For example, in Begbie Lord Justice Sedley stated that reliance will not be necessary where 
“the government has made known how it intends to exercise powers which affect the public 
at large”.173 In his minority judgement in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) Lord Bingham appears to be applying this approach when he 
holds that on the facts the Government could not lawfully resile from its representation, made 
generally to the Chagossian Islanders, without compelling reason, and in such circumstances 
it was not necessary to show (detrimental) reliance.174 
Given the importance of reliance as part of the test for legitimate expectations, whether as an 
essential element or relevant consideration, it is strange that few cases consider what actually 
constitutes reliance for the purposes of establishing an expectation. Bibi is an important 
exception, where Lord Justice Schiemann reading the judgment of the court explained that 
reliance (as a relevant factor) need not involve “concrete” detriment (in the sense of a 
financial or other tangible loss) or a change of position of the representee. Lord Justice 
Schiemann explains that a lack of change of position does not mean there has been no 
reliance: a representee may maintain their position as a result of a representation, which they 
might otherwise have changed. Furthermore, while “moral” detriment (the prolonged 
disappointment of the failure to fulfil the expectation, and the potential detriment that might 
occur in the future) might not be enough to found an estoppel claim in private law, it was 
relevant for the concepts of fairness and abuse of power in public law.175  
Defining the concept of reliance so widely may mean that it is always present in cases where 
a legitimate expectation is claimed, at least where the representee is aware of any 
representation that has been made, thus making the distinctions between the approaches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
172 This resulted from the particular interpretation of reliance adopted by Schiemann LJ, discussed below. The 
outcome of the case may also be related to the fact that the applicants were in a particularly vulnerable position 
as asylum seekers, and wholly dependent on the local authority for accommodation. 
173 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1133D to E. 
Craig also notes that it should not be necessary to prove reliance where a public body seeks to depart from its 
previously published policy: Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edition, 2012) p 554. 
174 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61 at [73]. 
175 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [53] to [55]. 
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outlined above more apparent than real. However, Lord Justice Schiemann’s discussion of the 
concept of reliance should be understood in the context of the part of the judgment in which it 
appears. This essentially sets out guidelines for the local authority decision-maker on how 
they should re-take the challenged decision, this time taking the legitimate expectation into 
account. Lord Justice Schiemann does not say anything about how a court should review the 
re-taken decision, if the decision-maker were challenged again for failing to take the 
legitimate expectation properly into account.  
b) Reliance in decisions by English courts on cases involving EU law 
When English courts have been called on to protect legitimate expectations in cases involving 
EU law, the court has often failed to explicitly state whether it is applying the English law or 
EU law test of legitimate expectations.176 Where courts have engaged with this issue head on, 
they have mostly been content to assume that the application of either test leads to materially 
the same result.177 This means that reliance has formed an important part of the test for 
establishing a legitimate expectation even in cases involving EU law issues, although the 
Luxembourg courts have not routinely or explicitly considered reliance as a relevant 
consideration.  
For example, in United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of 
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, where changes to the allocation of fishing 
quotas were challenged, Mr Justice Cranston considered whether detrimental reliance had 
been demonstrated on the facts of the case (although he accepted that in some circumstances 
it might not be required).178 Similarly, the fact that the claimant had refrained from acting (for 
example, by bringing legal proceedings) in reliance on the defendant Minister’s assurance 
was a consideration that Mr Justice Charles took into account in R (Actis SA) v Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government when upholding a claim of legitimate 
expectation in relation to a change to the Building Regulations that was required to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
176 See, for example, Office of Fair Trading v Somerfield Stores Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 400; Cornwall 
Waste Forum St Dennis Branch v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 
379; R (Sovio Wines Ltd) v Food Standards Agency (Wine Standards Branch) [2009] EWHC 383 (Admin); R 
(Actis SA) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007] EWHC 2417 (Admin). 
177 See, for example, Azam & Co v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 960 (Ch) at [37]; R v Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714 at [26]; 
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce v Highland Meats Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 238 (Mar) at [98].  
178 United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs [2013] EWHC 1959 (Admin) at [104]. 
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notified under Directive 98/34/EC.179 The focus of English courts on reliance when 
determining the existence of a legitimate expectation has also affected the way in which cases 
are presented to the court – for example, in R (Energie EST LDA) v Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change and Sovio Wines the applicants emphasised the fact that they had 
relied on the claimed representation as a central part of their case.180 
c) Some conclusions 
The central position which English courts have accorded to an individual’s reliance on a 
public authority’s representation when determining the existence of a legitimate expectation 
may be explained by reference to two factors: first, the relationship between the protection of 
legitimate expectations and the private law doctrine of estoppel, discussed above, and second, 
a judicial fear that without a requirement of reliance, legitimate expectations might be 
pleaded even where an individual had no knowledge of the policy or practice said to have 
generated the expectation. The latter situation could be problematic from a principled point of 
view, enlarging the meaning of the term legitimate expectation to such an extent that it no 
longer functions as a distinct and recognisable category.181 However, from the point of view 
of holding public authorities to account for their use of public power, it should not be 
possible to avoid the consequences of making an assurance, following a practice or 
publishing a policy simply by virtue of the fact that an individual was not aware of it.182 
 As explained above, estoppel no longer has a significant role to play in the modern 
application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. English courts have 
emphasised that considerations of fairness which underpin public law mean that situations in 
which a private law action of estoppel would not arise might nevertheless ground a claim of 
legitimate expectation.183 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
179 R (Actis SA) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007] EWHC 2417 (Admin) at 
[132]. 
180 R (Energie EST LDA) v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2013] EWHC 3026 (Admin) at 
[71]; R (Sovio Wines Ltd) v Food Standards Agency (Wine Standards Branch) [2009] EWHC 383 (Admin) at 
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181 Elliot, “Legitimate Expectation, Consistency and Abuse of Power: the Rashid Case” [2005] Judicial Review 
281 at [8]. 
182 As noted above (see Section B.I.3.), this problem could be solved by a more widespread recognition of a 
principle of consistent application or equal treatment in English administrative law. Such a principle may be 
emerging, but in the meantime the principle of protection of legitimate expectations still has a role to play in the 
policing of administrative action. 
183 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [55]. 
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III. The public authority generating the expectation 
There are two important themes in the case law in relation to the role of the public authority 
in generating the legitimate expectation: whether the individual or body making a 
representation has the power or authority to do so, both in terms of the legality of the 
representation and whom the representation can be said to bind; and what a public authority 
must do in order to discharge its duty in relation to any legitimate expectation it may have 
generated. 
1. The power of the public authority to make the representation 
As will become evident from the discussion below, the power of the public authority is an 
important factor in establishing a legitimate expectation and has been the subject of much 
discussion in the case law of the English courts in cases involving purely domestic law issues, 
although to a much lesser extent where EU law is engaged. Two main issues can be isolated. 
First, whether a representor has legal authority to make a representation. Given the English 
law principle that the executive can only act within the powers transferred to it by Parliament, 
a representation made outside the scope of those powers will in general not be binding – such 
a representation may be termed an “ultra vires” one. The second issue, which rose to the fore 
after it was discussed in R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department184 is whether an official from one part of the executive has the power to bind 
another part of the executive. 
a) Ultra vires representations and statutory schemes 
The issue of representations made outside the representor’s power most often arises in the 
context of statutory schemes, in which an area of law is wholly regulated by statute law (Acts 
of Parliament and Statutory Instruments). For example, in Westminster City Council v The 
Albert Court Residents’ Association, the corporation responsible for managing the Royal 
Albert Hall, a concert and event venue in London, applied to the local council for a variation 
of its premises licence, to allow among other things extended opening hours, extended hours 
for serving alcohol, and for boxing and wrestling to be permitted licensable activities in the 
venue.185 Under the relevant statutory provisions there was a clear obligation to grant an 
application for variation of a licence where no objection had been made to the application 
within a particular time frame.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
184 R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 27. 
185 Westminster City Council v The Albert Court Residents’ Association [2011] EWCA Civ 430 at [3]. 
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The court was prepared to assume that the applicant Residents’ Association had a legitimate 
expectation that they would be notified of the licence application, and that such an 
expectation was breached by the local council’s failure to do so. However, despite the fact 
that this breach had resulted in the Residents’ Association not being able to bring their 
objection in time, the legitimate expectation could not be upheld in the face of an explicit 
statutory rule which stated the circumstances in which the variation of a licence application 
had to be granted. In a judgment with which the rest of the court agreed, Lord Justice Stanley 
Burton held that this was “no more than an incident of the principle of legislative 
supremacy”. The statutory duty to grant the application trumped any legitimate expectation 
which conflicted with it.186  
Similarly, in Begbie the representation generating the alleged legitimate expectation 
conflicted with the statutory limits to the Secretary of State’s discretion, and could therefore 
not be upheld. That case concerned a scheme offering assistance with school fees for children 
from underprivileged backgrounds. Prior to the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party had 
stated its intention to abolish the scheme if it regained power, while indicating that students 
already enrolled in the scheme would continue to benefit from it. Having won the election, 
the newly formed Labour government duly went about dismantling the assisted school places 
scheme, which included putting in place transitional discretionary powers to enable the 
Secretary of State for Education to continue to offer assistance to a particular individual 
where the circumstances mandated it. Given that these powers were presented as to be 
exercised only in exceptional circumstances, and the effect of the legitimate expectation 
contended for would have obliged the power to be exercised in the case of “virtually all 
children receiving primary education” at a certain type of school,187 the legitimate 
expectation could not be upheld.188 
There is one important exception to the general rule that representations made outside the 
power of the public authority in question cannot generate legitimate expectations, which 
flows from Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
European Court of Human Rights has held that the concept of “possessions” in that article 
includes legitimate expectations when they relate to the enjoyment of a property right, even 
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and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 at 1117F to G. 
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where the expectation results from the ultra vires act of a public authority.189 However, the 
individual claiming to have a legitimate expectation will still have to prove that the public 
authority acted disproportionately when it interfered with the legitimate expectation. In 
undertaking this analysis the English courts have conducted a similar balancing exercise to 
that which they undertake when considering whether there is an overriding public interest 
which justifies resiling from an expectation.190 
b) The authority to bind other parts of the executive 
The case of R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department is an 
unusual one. Although the effect of the court’s decision was to uphold the legitimate 
expectation contended for by the applicants, only half of the majority based their reasoning 
on legitimate expectations. The other two judges in the majority cited a more formalistic 
reason for dismissing the appeal: the guidance upon which the Secretary of State relied was 
unlawful, not because it conflicted with a legitimate expectation, but because its content 
should have been included as an amendment to the Immigration Rules, thus subject to 
Parliamentary scrutiny.  
The different reasoning evident in the majority judgments makes BAPIO a difficult case from 
which to draw conclusions as to the content of the principle of legitimate expectations in 
English law. Nevertheless, the judgments which do deal with legitimate expectations are 
important for their treatment of whether one part of the executive has the authority to bind 
another. Lord Rodger, agreeing with the majority view, explained that “the executive power 
of the Crown is, in practice, exercised by a single body of ministers, making up Her 
Majesty’s Government”. In these circumstances it would not make sense to separate the 
powers and duties of the Secretary of State for the Home Department from those of the 
Secretary of State for Health, and the latter will and should be bound by representations made 
by the former.191 By contrast, Lord Scott, giving a minority judgment, warned against using 
the constitutional theory of the indivisibility of the Crown to decide on the lawfulness of 
guidance issued by a minister, upon which the majority appeared to rely. Ministers have quite 
different and separate statutory powers and duties and he could see no reason “why what is 
done by one department in the proper discharge of its statutory duties should be taken to be a 
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190 Rowland v Environmental Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885 at [96]. 
191 R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 27 at [33] to [34]. 
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limitation on what can be done by another department in the otherwise proper and 
unexceptionable exercise of its own … statutory duties and powers”.192 Interestingly, while 
Lord Rodger’s approach would have the potential to radically extend the scope of the 
principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it applied the old-fashioned, more 
traditional theory of the constitutional indivisibility of the Crown, and the idea of the Cabinet 
operating together under the direction of the Prime Minister. By contrast, Lord Scott’s 
approach is the more realistic one given the increase in importance of Government 
departments for executing legislative decisions, the wide range of powers and duties wielded 
by those departments and the fact that the interests and views of different departments may 
often conflict. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Lord Rodger’s approach could still have 
been applied if the case had arisen two years later, when the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition formed the Government. 
In any case, this aspect of BAPIO has been questioned in subsequent case law and academic 
commentary.193 The authority of one part of the executive to bind another was implicitly 
rejected by the court in R (Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,194 again in 
the context of immigration law. The repeated grant of entry clearances by immigration 
officers was not a practice which could bind the Secretary of State in her use of the quite 
distinct power to refuse or revoke an entry visa on the basis that exclusion is “conducive to 
the public good”.195 Nevertheless, the specific national security context in which the decision 
was made may have been a reason for the rejection of the BAPIO approach – the Court of 
Appeal also went further than the judge below in rejecting the argument that the actions of 
previous Secretaries of State could be relevant for whether the applicant had a valid 
legitimate expectation. In effect the Court of Appeal held that in this context no 
representation or practice relating to an individual entrant could ever override the Secretary 
of State’s duty to the public as a whole.196 
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c) Some conclusions 
Concerning the relationship between legitimate expectations and the authority of a public 
body to make a particular promise or engage in a certain practice, the traditional position 
shared by EU law and English law is clear: a public body cannot extend or exceed the limits 
of the power transferred to it or bind other public bodies by engendering hopes or 
expectations in an individual. However, the English courts have approached these issues 
slightly more flexibly than the European courts, where required to do so through their 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, or where, as in BAPIO, they 
have considered that the situation demands it. 
2. Discharging the legitimate expectation 
In certain circumstances, a public authority will be able to discharge a legitimate expectation 
where that expectation was taken into account in the decision-making process. Although this 
is more relevant for procedural legitimate expectations, namely those where the expectation 
is that a particular procedure will be followed in the decision-making process, taking the 
legitimate expectation into account has had the same effect in certain cases where the 
expectation was one of a substantive benefit.197 This is similar to the EU law requirement of 
giving due respect to legitimate expectations when enacting retrospective legislation.  
a) Cases dealing with purely English issues 
How a legitimate expectation might be discharged by the public authority by taking it into 
account in the decision-making process has been dealt with in different ways by different 
courts. For example, in Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago198 Lord Dyson 
JSC giving the judgment for the majority held that the authority was under a duty to consider 
the legitimate expectation they had generated in the decision-making process. In the context, 
failure to do so was enough to constitute breach of the legitimate expectation.199 In R (Bloggs 
61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department200  and R (Barker) v Waverley Borough 
Council201 the same principle was applied to come to the opposite conclusion: since the 
contended for legitimate expectations were taken into account in the decision-making process 
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the respective decisions could not be faulted. Once the expectations were taken into account, 
it was for the decision-maker to decide how much weight to accord them in the decision-
making process, and the relative weighting of different factors could only be judicially 
challenged if “so unreasonable” that a reasonable decision-maker would not have applied 
such weighting.202 
Other cases offer examples of more implicit support for this principle. For example, in 
BAPIO the fact that the challenged guidance applied to four different categories of highly 
skilled medical student immigrants was a relevant factor for determining whether the 
Secretary of State took legitimate expectations into account when making the decision to 
issue the guidance. If she had done, it was likely that she would have adopted a more nuanced 
approach.203 Unusually, in R (Huitson) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners it was a 
relevant fact that the judge in the court below took the legitimate expectation into account 
when considering whether retrospective legislation struck a fair balance between the interests 
of the general body of taxpayers and the right of the claimant to the enjoyment of is 
possessions and was therefore justified.204 
b) Cases with an EU law element 
There are also examples among the cases with some connection with EU law of public 
authorities taking individual interests into account and courts finding as a result that any duty 
to give effect to a legitimate expectation has been discharged. United Kingdom Association of 
Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs205 
was a challenge to changes made to the system for allocating fishing quotas, which involved 
the defendant exercising a discretion accorded to him under the EU Common Fisheries 
Policy. A legitimate expectation was claimed to arise based on the previous practice of the 
Secretary of State as well as representations in various Government publications and 
statements, and to have been breached by a retroactive change of this practice. While Mr 
Justice Cranston held at the outset that no precise and specific assurance had been made on 
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out the facts,206 the judge nevertheless went on to consider whether the breach of any 
legitimate expectation could have been justified. A relevant consideration in this regard was 
that the Department had changed its methodology in response to concerns raised by fish 
producer organisations, thus taking into account their interests.207 Similarly, in Rayner 
Thomas v Carmarthenshire Council,208 where it was argued that the imposition of a particular 
planning condition disappointed the legitimate expectations of the applicant, the court held 
that “there was plainly careful consideration … by the defendant and its advisers” of the issue 
on which the applicant’s claimed legitimate expectation rested, and in any case the only 
legitimate expectation raised on the facts was that the applicant’s complaints and objections 
would be taken into account.209 
c) Some conclusions 
The approach of the English courts outlined above shows another situation in which a 
legitimate expectation will not bind the public authority which has generated it, alongside 
situations where there is an overriding public interest or the expectation conflicts with a 
statutory duty. This factor – taking the legitimate expectation into account in the decision-
making process – is not something which has been an explicit feature of the jurisprudence of 
the European courts. To some extent, the obligation to apply transitional measures in cases of 
retroactive legislation operates in a similar way, although it arises by operation of law and 
does not require any individual to demonstrate that they have a particular expectation.  
The approach taken by the English courts makes sense where the expectation is one that a 
particular procedure will be followed – if such a procedure has been followed, the 
expectation has not been breached and the administrative action is unimpeachable. However, 
it is more problematic in cases where the expectation is one of a substantive outcome. The 
protection of legitimate expectations is based on a relationship between the administration 
and the individuals it governs, founded on considerations of trust, fair dealing and proper use 
of public power. Where a clear assurance has been given, simply taking the legitimate 
expectation into account may not give it the necessary weight in the decision-making process. 
In cases of substantive legitimate expectations, as well as considering whether the legitimate 
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expectation was taken into account, a court should also be willing to assess the relative 
weight the expectation was accorded in comparison to other interests, and compare this with 
their own view of the balance to be struck between an expectation and any overriding public 
interest. 
IV. The role of the court 
The third main actor in legitimate expectations cases is the court before whom a challenge to 
administrative action is brought on grounds of legitimate expectation. In the course of 
developing their approach to the protection of legitimate expectations, English courts have 
often reflected carefully on their role in upholding or denying legitimate expectations. Two 
main reasons for this present themselves – first, the general fear of English administrative 
courts of encroaching on areas which are the province of the executive, exacerbated by the 
possibility of carrying out substantive review in legitimate expectation cases,210 and second, 
the fact that they are continuing to search for a principled test and justification for the 
protection of legitimate expectations in English law.211 In the following sections, two aspects 
of the role of the court in legitimate expectations cases will be discussed in more detail: the 
intensity of review to which a Court will subject administrative conduct in breach of a 
legitimate expectation, and what relief the court will order where a finding of legitimate 
expectation is made out. 
1. The intensity of review 
As explained above, the courts have adopted different standards of review to the challenged 
administrative conduct in cases where legitimate expectations have been raised. The different 
standards of review and the reasons for adopting them as evident from the recent case law of 
the English courts will be outlined in the following section, with a particular focus on 
distinctions drawn in relation to the type of legitimate expectation and the context in which it 
arises, as well as the application of a new standard of proportionality review. 
a) Distinctions based on procedural and substantive legitimate expectations 
Following Coughlan, some courts have drawn a distinction between the standard of review 
that can be applied to procedural or substantive legitimate expectations. The leading 
judgments in Naik and Bhatt Murphy both applied the distinction drawn in Coughlan to 
decide whether a legitimate expectation should be upheld. In Naik, Lord Justice Carnwath 
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used Coughlan as support for the statement that “where a lawful promise or practice has 
induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, the 
court will consider whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and 
different course would amount to an abuse of power”.212 In Bhatt Murphy, Mr Justice Laws 
explained that while the creation of a new policy can only be tested against the standards of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness, where such a policy is in breach of a prior substantive 
legitimate expectation this will be judged by a “more rigorous standard”, namely the court’s 
own view of what fairness requires.213 The court is thus able to substitute its judgment for 
that of the decision-maker, rather than simply considering whether the decision reached was 
one of a number of possible outcomes. 
The difference that the intensity with which a decision is reviewed can make to the outcome 
of the case was made strikingly clear in R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for 
Education.214 That case involved a decision by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, on coming to power in 2010, to end a programme started by the 
previous Labour government which funded the building of new schools. As a result, while 
certain planned building projects would still go ahead, others would be stopped.215 Six local 
authorities brought a claim of judicial review challenging the decision to end building 
programmes in their areas which had previously been given outline approval. While Mr 
Justice Holman did not find there was an assurance that was clear and unambiguous enough 
to generate a substantive legitimate expectation, the “pressing and focussed” impact of the 
Government department’s past conduct on the applicants meant that they should have been 
consulted before the decisions to end their particular programmes were taken.216 Although the 
factual scenario was not enough to justify substantive protection of expectations, it did 
require procedural protection to be given. 
b) The character of the decision 
In other cases, the context in which the decision is taken will have an impact on the level of 
scrutiny to which the court subjects it to. This is a general feature of English administrative 
law – in certain areas the executive may be held to have superior institutional knowledge, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
212 R (Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1546 at [19]. 
213 R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [35]. 
214 R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin) 
215 R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin) at [3]. 
216 R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 (Admin) at [78] to [81] 
and [90] to [94]. 
50	  
	  
leading to a more deferential approach by the court, while in other areas the nature of the 
interests at stake, for example as human rights, may justify more “anxious scrutiny”.217 In 
Luton, Mr Justice Holman called on this subject-based approach to the intensity of review to 
justify his decision to deal with the case in an “impressionistic way”, “without unduly 
detailed or sophisticated enquiry”, despite the large number of documents, totalling around 
7,500 pages, which the parties had brought to the courts attention. No human rights issues 
arose, the claimants themselves being public authorities, and the political, large scale macro-
economic character of the decision challenged meant that any public law irrationality or 
unlawfulness should be obvious on a relatively broad inquiry.218 
A similar approach has been adopted in cases where the legitimate expectation is claimed as a 
result of the exercise of a discretion under EU law. In United Kingdom Association of Fish 
Producer Organisations Mr Justice Cranston, summarising the position in English law on the 
protection of legitimate expectations, noted that the intensity of review would depend on the 
character of the decision – again, less intensive review would be required in cases falling in 
the macro-political field.219 Applying this principle to the facts of the case, the judge noted 
that the subject matter of the case, the Common Fisheries Policy and its administration, lay 
“towards the macro-political end of the policy-making spectrum”. He noted that due to the 
scarcity of fish as a resource, decisions made under this policy have “important social, 
economic and environmental considerations” and as such were “highly contentious and a 
matter of intense political discussion”.220 These factors all made it more difficult for the 
applicants to prove that their legitimate expectations had been affected – they would have to 
show a very strong individual interest in such situations in order to outweigh the wider public 
interest. 
c) A possible proportionality test 
In the case R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,221 Lord 
Justice Laws sought to introduce a new standard for testing whether a legitimate expectation 
has been justifiably breached, based on a traditional human rights analysis of whether that 
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breach is a proportionate response to a legitimate aim.222 Such an approach could have 
offered a more structured, more transparent way for the courts to carry out the balancing act 
between an individual’s and the public interest and to explain how a court reached its 
conclusion on a particular set of facts. This approach has not been adopted or even discussed 
in subsequent cases involving purely domestic issues, and it is perhaps telling that Lord 
Justice Laws himself does not apply it to claims of legitimate expectation raised before him 
in later cases, such as Bhatt Murphy. 
Nevertheless, a proportionality test has been applied in cases where EU law has been engaged 
either directly or indirectly. For example, in United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer 
Organisations, the means by which the decision to change policy was undertaken were 
proportionate – there were safeguards in the decision-making methodology, that methodology 
had been changed in response to comments from producer organisations, there was a 
possibility to appeal the outcomes of the methodology, and there were no suitable alternative 
ways to maximise use of allocated quota.223 Here, although proportionality was not used 
specifically as a standard of review for the administrative action, which the judge had already 
held was justified, it was implicit that a lack of proportionality in the way the decision was 
taken could have been another way of striking it down. 
Another example is Cornwall Waste Forum St Dennis Branch v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government,224 a case where EU law was engaged by the fact that 
planning permissions for a waste plant required special permissions under the Habitats 
Regulations, implementing the Habitats Directive225 in English law. In that case Lord Justice 
Pill, with whose judgement the other judges agreed noted that in the court below the judge 
had referred to the proportionality test set out in Abdi and Nadarajah, as the method for 
ascertaining whether a legitimate expectation has been overridden by public interest 
considerations.226 However, although this method was given implicit support by that 
repetition, no balancing exercise was carried out by the Court of Appeal, since any legitimate 
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expectation had already been rejected on the basis that the planning inspector who allegedly 
gave the assurance had no authority to bind the competent decision-making authority, the 
Secretary of State, and in any case the circumstances had changed such that a change of 
position was justified.227 
d) Some conclusions 
The adoption of Lord Woolf’s approach in Coughlan by judges in subsequent cases shows 
that the courts will, in certain circumstances, scrutinise administrative action more closely 
where it is in breach of a legitimate expectation. This “unique intensity of review”, in 
Watson’s words, is important viewed in the wider context of English administrative law, 
where administrative action will (excluding situations where a greater intensity of review is 
mandated by European Union or human rights law) normally only be subject to 
reasonableness review.228  
The European courts have not explicitly stated the intensity with which they review Union 
and Member State conduct in breach of legitimate expectations – the paucity of cases in 
which legitimate expectations have been upheld suggests that the EU courts apply a light-
touch review, which is supported by the fact that the European courts are slow to hold that a 
clear and unambiguous assurance has been made. Ironically, applying an EU-style 
proportionality test is seen by English lawyers as a method of scrutinising conduct in breach 
of legitimate expectations more closely – while the EU courts themselves seem to apply a 
lesser intensity of review than their English counterparts.229 
2. The relief ordered by the court once a legitimate expectation has been found 
As explained above, in English law it is at the court’s discretion whether to order any remedy 
as a result of a successful judicial review claim.230 Thus as well as undertaking a balancing 
act to determine whether or not a legitimate expectation has arisen and been breached, courts 
also take into account competing considerations of individual rights and the public interest 
when deciding what relief to order. In some cases where the courts have denied the existence 
of a legitimate expectation, they have nevertheless offered some obiter discussion on what 
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remedy would have been offered if an expectation had been found. The courts have also 
applied EU law remedies in cases where they have been obliged to do so. 
a) Cases involving purely domestic law issues 
Cases in which the legitimate expectation has been upheld by the courts and a substantive 
remedy ordered are few: they include R (Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] EWCA 
Civ 327, Paponette and Rashid.  
Patel, a case in which a medical student had been given assurances that the qualification 
offered by his chosen institution for medical study would be sufficient to allow him to 
continue his studies in the United Kingdom, is by far the strongest example of a court’s 
willingness to protect a legitimate expectation in recent years. Lord Justice Lloyd Jones, with 
whom the other judges agreed, held that the claimant’s legitimate expectation was breached 
when the General Medical Council changed its policy without adopting transitional 
provisions that would have covered the claimant’s situation.231 Lord Justice Lloyd Jones was 
not prepared, nor did he consider it necessary, to state what the transitional measures should 
have been, or to impose any that might apply to other individuals in a similar situation.232 
However, in relation to the situation of the claimant in question, he did order that specific 
relief should be given of a substantive nature: the General Medical Council was required to 
recognise the claimant’s medical degree as an acceptable overseas qualification for the 
purposes of the Medical Act 1983, thus enabling him to practice as a doctor in the United 
Kingdom.233 
In Paponette, the judge at first instance had required the defendants to reimburse the entire 
fees paid by the taxi association for use of the taxi rank which they had been assigned to in 
breach of their legitimate expectation. When it upheld this decision, the Privy Council 
questioned whether this was the correct award, suggesting that the judge should have taken 
into account any costs the taxi association might have incurred for using another taxi rank, 
and deducted these. Nevertheless, as the relief granted by the judge was not appealed, the 
Privy Council was unable to modify the initial order.234 In Rashid the failure to apply an 
immigration policy to the applicant, an Iraqi Kurd, although it had been applied to other 
individuals in the same position, led to an order by the court that the Secretary of State should 
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give the applicant indefinite leave to remain. This was despite the fact that, as a failure to 
apply a pre-existing policy without a clear representation being made to an individual, the 
facts of this case fell within the type “secondary procedural expectation” (as so characterised 
in Bhatt Murphy) and thus would normally justify procedural rather than substantive 
protection.  
Cases where substantive relief was discussed but not ordered include Majed, and Bibi. 
In Majed, where the defendant local council was found to have breached the applicants’ 
legitimate expectation that they would be notified if an application for planning permission 
was made by one of their neighbours, the court held that enforcing the legitimate expectation 
and annulling the planning permission was inconceivable, relying on: “the history of this 
matter, in particular the lack of any development plan objection, the lack of any real planning 
harm to the appellant, and, by contrast, the very real and obvious prejudice that would be 
suffered by the interested party”. None of the other adjoining occupiers had objected to the 
planning permission, the building works had been completed, and the building extension for 
which planning permission had been granted was already occupied as part of the interested 
party’s home.235 The court came to this decision on the basis that the legitimate expectation 
required the issue to be remitted to the initial decision-maker for re-decision, but that there 
was no need to do so given the obvious outcome that the local council would come to the 
conclusion that the planning permission should be upheld. However, the court did recognise 
the importance of granting declaratory relief in the form of a statement that the applicants’ 
legitimate expectation had been breached, to prevent the same error from occurring again in 
the future.236 
The case of Bibi provides a further example of how the court will exercise its discretion to 
order relief where it confirms the existence of a legitimate expectation. There, the court held 
that it “will not order the authority to honour its promise where to do so would be to assume 
the powers of the executive”.237 The challenged decision would therefore be remitted to the 
initial decision-maker, who would be obliged to re-take that decision taking into account the 
legitimate expectation as found by the court. Once a new decision had been made, this could 
again be challenged before the courts if it had failed to take the legitimate expectation into 
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account.238 Despite its considerable deference to the executive decision-maker, the court 
suggested a number of factors which the local authority should take into account when re-
taking its decision.239 The detail in which these factors were expressed, coupled with the 
possibility of further review of the remitted decision, should have led a prudent public 
authority to follow the court’s suggestions. 
b) Cases with an EU law element  
Of the cases analysed where there is some connection with EU law, in only three has the 
court confirmed the existence of a legitimate expectation. 
In Actis SA the court found that the Secretary of State acted in breach of a legitimate 
expectation by not consulting the claimants about a change to the Building Regulations.240 
EU law was not engaged directly by the legitimate expectation claim, although it was 
relevant to another ground of review, which stated that the change should have been notified 
to the Commission. However, the judge reserved his decision on the remedy to be awarded to 
a later hearing, and no record of this hearing is available in the online databases. It may be 
that an agreement was reached between the parties, rendering judgment on relief unnecessary. 
Test Claimants in the FII Group and Fleming (trading as Bodycraft) v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners241 were both cases in which the claim of legitimate expectation was directly 
governed by EU law. Similarly to the situation in Test Claimants, the breach of legitimate 
expectation in Fleming arose as a result of the retroactive restriction of a limitation period for 
the repayment of tax sums required from individuals in breach of EU law, in this case value 
added tax. Finding that the retroactive effect of the regulation and the failure to introduce 
transitional measures when substituting what was effectively an unlimited time for bringing 
claims with a three year limitation period was contrary to EU law, the House of Lords had no 
qualms about disapplying the regulation in question. However, it left the issue of the length 
and nature of any transitional period to Parliament and the Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners.242 
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In Test Claimants, the Supreme Court was also willing to disapply national legislation in 
breach of EU law, and stated that this would be the case in respect of section 107 of the 
Finance Act 2007, which the whole court had agreed contravened the EU law principles of 
effectiveness and protection of legitimate expectations. In relation to the other challenged 
legal provision, section 320 of the Finance Act 2004, two questions was referred to the Court 
of Justice, which found that the situation caused by the enactment of that legal provision was 
contrary to EU law.243 However, while the English courts were conscious of their duty to 
disapply legislation to the extent that it is in breach of EU law, the legislature was not fast 
enough in passing new legislation to fill the resulting gap. Thus a recent infringement action 
brought by the Commission against the United Kingdom for failure to implement the 
judgment in the Test Claimants preliminary reference case was upheld by the Court of 
Justice. Although the United Kingdom argued that it was in the process of passing an 
amendment to section 107 which would render it compatible with EU law, this was rejected 
as irrelevant for the question of a Member State’s compliance with its obligations under 
Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. Because the offending section was still in 
place at the end of the time prescribed for the implementation of the judgment in Test 
Claimants, the UK had failed to comply with its obligations under the Treaties, and although 
no damages claim had been brought by the Commission, the UK was required to pay the 
costs of the case.244 
c) Some conclusions 
Some explanation for the decisions of English courts to award or refuse relief in cases where 
a legitimate expectation has arisen can be offered by a consideration of the subject matter 
which the cases dealt with. The planning law context in which the decision in Majed was 
taken is an obvious example – significant building works may have been carried out in 
reliance on a planning permission, and it could be disproportionately onerous to require these 
to be dismantled as a result of a legitimate expectation which had been breached by the local 
council. Similarly, the realities of the area which housing law seeks to regulate led to a more 
restrained, deferent approach of the court towards the decision-maker in Bibi. In that case the 
court recognised the difficulties that would be caused by allowing certain people to jump to 
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the top of the list for social housing due to a legitimate expectation, given that the personal 
circumstances of others on the list might put them in more pressing need of social housing at 
any particular time. Furthermore, the serious housing shortage made decision-making in this 
area extremely difficult, and justified those decisions being taken by a democratically 
mandated body with greater access to expert information that the court.245 The court will 
however take a more active role in ordering relief where it considers that the demands of 
fairness mandate this, for example in Rashid where Home Office failures were “startling and 
prolonged” and there was evidence of the “gross nature of errors”.246 
The availability of relief is also the area in which there is the greatest difference between the 
approach of English courts in cases with an EU law element and those involving purely 
domestic situations. On the one hand, in cases with an EU law element, further remedies are 
available to the court, such as the disapplication of primary legislation, which sends a strong 
message to the legislature that the challenged measure must be amended, or new legislation 
put in its place. On the other hand, some of the courts’ remedial flexibility is taken away, as 
they are not able to hold that the legitimate expectation can be protected by procedural 
methods, or that any duty in respect of the expectation has been discharged by taking it into 
account in the decision-making process. This remedial rigidity is further underlined by the 
recently upheld Commission action against the United Kingdom for failing to implement the 
judgment in Test Claimants. The court’s disapplication remedy was not enough – in order to 
comply with EU law, the offending legislation had to be repealed by Parliament. This is an 
important difference between English law and EU law which may explain the different 
approaches the courts use when assessing the existence of a legitimate expectation. 
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D. Recent case law of the European Court of Justice on legitimate 
expectations 
I. Introduction and scope 
This section will consider recent cases decided by the European Court of Justice in order to 
track the development of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in 
European Union law. As with the case law of the courts of England and Wales, the scope of 
this analysis has been limited to cases decided since the year 2000. The pool of cases has 
further been limited to only those decided by the European Court of Justice (as opposed to the 
General Court or Court of First Instance) where the term “legitimate expectations” can be 
found among the key-words assigned to the case on Eur-LEX. These restrictions are intended 
to catch the most important cases while also enabling a more in-depth consideration of a 
limited number of cases. 
At the outset it should be noted that the success rate of cases in which claims of legitimate 
expectations are raised is even lower in cases decided by the European Court of Justice than 
in those decided by English courts – of the 48 cases analysed, in only three was the existence 
of a legitimate expectation accepted.247 Although in many of the cases under consideration 
the Court of Justice has held that it is for the national court to decide whether the 
requirements for a finding of legitimate expectation are present,248 it is nevertheless striking 
that even in cases where the Court of Justice admits jurisdiction to determine whether a 
legitimate expectation has arisen, a positive finding is extremely rare. Furthermore, in a 
number of cases where the Court of First Instance had confirmed the existence of a legitimate 
expectation, the European Court of Justice overturned this decision on appeal.249 As well as 
the Court’s restrictive view of the division of jurisdiction in this area between it and national 
courts, two other factors may go some way to explaining this paucity. First, many of the cases 
in which the European Court is asked to determine the existence of a legitimate expectation 
have arisen in the field of State aid, where the Court has developed a particularly strict 
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EU:C:2013:834; Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 
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Állam at [80] and [81]. 
249 For example, Case C-519/07 P Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV, ECLI:EU:C:2009:556; 
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approach to the application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. 
Secondly, unlike the English courts, the European Court of Justice has identified certain 
situations where the operation of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is 
completely excluded – for example, a legitimate expectation cannot be pleaded as a collateral 
defence to an infringement action.250 
Recent cases raising issues of legitimate expectations before the Court of Justice have arisen 
across the spectrum of EU law. By far the largest group of cases are annulment actions in 
respect of an unfavourable Commission decision on State aid.251 Other cases deal with, 
among other things, EU remedies for sums wrongly paid or tax issues,252 fines for breach of 
competition law,253 and the common market.254 To some extent, the preponderance of cases 
concerning similar subject matters has resulted in the Court of Justice developing sector-
specific approaches to the protection of legitimate expectations in those areas. As explained 
above, this is most obvious in State aid cases, where the scope for the application of the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations has been limited by the Court in order to 
prevent the strict procedure set out in the Treaties from being undermined, but the Court has 
also developed settled jurisprudence in the context of the common market, Common 
Agricultural Policy, and setting of fines for breaches of competition law. 
In addition to the development of sector-specific approaches, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice has also developed horizontally, across all cases in which the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations is raised. Although this case law has seen 
far less development in the last 15 years than that of the English courts, perhaps because of 
the tendency of the European Court of Justice to repeat verbatim its previous statements as to 
a particular legal position, or simply because the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations is at a less developed stage in English law, subtle changes can be identified. 
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ECLI:EU:C:2013:387; Case C-369/09 P ISD Polska sp. z o.o. and Others v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:175; Case C-519/07 P Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:556; Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:416. 
252 Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, 
EU:C:2013:834; Case C-201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539. 
253 Case C-501/11 P Schindler Holding Ltd and others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:522; Case C-
70/12 Quinn Barlo Ltd and others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:351. 
254 Case C-98/14 Berlington Hungary Tanácsadó és Szolgáltató kft and Others v Magyar Állam; Joined cases C-
37/02 and 38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport v Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, ECLI:EU:C:2004:443. 
61	  
	  
These will be discussed below in two sections: first, those relating to the individual who 
claims the benefit of the expectation, and second, those concerning approach of the courts in 
upholding or denying any expectations. 
II. The individual harbouring the legitimate expectation 
In cases concerning the protection of legitimate expectations which come before the Court of 
Justice, it may be misleading to think of the “individual” as one part of the relationship 
generated by a legitimate expectation. In the cases discussed in this section, the entity which 
claims the expectation is rarely an individual – instead, it is far more likely to be an 
undertaking (for example, a business with cross-border operations) or, particularly in State 
aid cases, a Member State of the EU. Nevertheless, cases involving individuals do arise, for 
example in the civil service law context, one of the areas of EU law in which the 
jurisprudence on the protection of legitimate expectations initially developed.255 The term is 
retained here as a useful shorthand to distinguish those entities entertaining legitimate 
expectations from the EU institutions allegedly generating such expectations. 
Regarding the individual harbouring the legitimate expectation, aspects of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on legitimate expectations which have seen some change are: one, the 
development of the concept of the prudent trader – the addition of subjective elements and 
more creative application of the concept; and two, a greater importance and relevance for an 
individual’s reliance on an assurance when determining whether an expectation has arisen. 
1. The state of knowledge of the individual 
As discussed above, the Court of Justice expects individuals to have a certain degree of 
knowledge concerning the situation in which the legitimate expectation arises, expressed by 
the label “prudent and circumspect trader”. This label arises in the classic ECJ statement on 
legitimate expectations, repeated time and again in the case law: “if a prudent and 
circumspect trader could have foreseen that the adoption of a Community measure is likely to 
affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted”.256 
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Despite the frequency with which this statement arises in the case law, the Court has rarely 
given further indication of what knowledge the prudent trader is imbued with. However, in a 
small number of recent cases, the Court has given slightly more depth to the character of the 
prudent trader. These cases are scattered across the spectrum of legitimate expectations cases, 
both in terms of their subject matter and the type of representation which has given rise to the 
expectation. For example, the cases in point cover areas such as State aid,257 the internal 
market,258 and tax advantage schemes for undertakings supplying renewable energy.259 The 
types of representation involved range from the previous administrative practice of the 
Commission260 and promises to keep a scheme in place until a certain point in time261 to 
previous Commission decisions in relation to similar situations.262 
a) A more subjective approach? 
In some of these recent cases, the tension between the objective and subjective elements in 
the European courts’ application of the test of the prudent trader to the cases which come 
before it has come to the foreground. Where the courts have considered the state of 
knowledge of the individual in greater depth, they have been more willing to focus on the 
subjective knowledge at the base of the legitimate expectation claimed. This has been used in 
the traditional way, outlined above,263 to support a finding that it was foreseeable that an 
existing situation would change and thus excluding the application of the protection of the 
principle of legitimate expectations, in the cases Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt 
Darmstadt264 and Mebrom NV v Commission.265 The Court of First Instance went further in 
Koninklijke Friesland Foods v Commission,266 using the subjective knowledge of the 
individual as one reason to confirm the existence of a legitimate expectation. 
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Plantanol was a preliminary reference concerning the interpretation of a Directive on the use 
of biofuels and other renewable resources for use in transport, and whether changes made to a 
(German) national tax exemption scheme were in compliance with the Directive and with 
general principles of EU law. While the Court of Justice emphasised that it was for the 
national court to determine whether “a prudent and circumspect economic operator could 
have foreseen the possibility of such withdrawal in a context such as that of the main 
proceedings”, it proceeded to give detailed guidance to the national court in making this 
determination.267 The national court was obliged to take into account all the circumstances of 
the case, in order to determine whether the applicant in the specific case “had sufficient 
information to permit it to expect that the tax exemption scheme at issue in the main 
proceedings could be withdrawn before the date initially laid down for its expiry”. Although 
this approach still adopts an objective view of what information might be available to a 
prudent and circumspect operator, it imports a subjective element in the instruction to the 
national court to take into account the particular circumstance of the case, in particular 
whether on the facts the applicant had sufficient information available to it. Furthermore, the 
approach of the Court of Justice implicitly leaves open the possibility for the national court to 
affirm a legitimate expectation on the basis of a subjective appreciation of the knowledge of 
the individual. If the national court found that the applicant had not had sufficient 
information, the withdrawal of the tax exemption would not have been foreseeable. 
The Court of First Instance has been willing to take the applicant’s characteristics into 
account to a greater extent in Mebrom and Koninklijke Friesland Foods v Commission to 
deny and confirm the existence of a legitimate expectation respectively. The applicant in 
Mebrom sought annulment of a Commission Decision refusing to allocate it an import quota 
for methyl bromide in 2005. The Decision resulted from a change in the administrative 
practice of the Commission, by which it no longer granted import quotas to actual importers, 
such as the applicant, but that fumigators, that is methyl bromide users, would apply for user 
licences, upon which basis importers would apply for corresponding import licences. In 
deciding that the applicant could not rely on any legitimate expectation allegedly generated 
by the Commission, the Court of First Instance first took an objective approach, considering 
what an “alert reader” would have inferred from a notice published by the Commission.268 
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However, when considering what a prudent trader could have foreseen, the Court of First 
Instance adopted a subjective approach, making specific reference to the fact that the 
applicant had admitted that it expected changes to the import scheme, and should thus have 
sought specific information concerning these changes.269 The applicant’s actual knowledge, 
rather than that of the hypothetical trader, thus informed the standard of foresight it was held 
to. The Court of Justice implicitly affirmed this approach, stating in support of its decision 
that the Commission had not breached the principle of protection of legitimate expectations 
that it was “undisputed that Mebrom … expected changes to the applicable regime from 1 
January 2005”.270 
Koninklijke Friesland Foods v Commission was a case concerning State aid implemented by 
the Netherlands for international financing activities, where transitional measures had been 
put in place to protect undertakings which were negatively affected by a Commission finding 
that the aid in question was incompatible with the common market. Due to the Commission’s 
conduct in relation to a similar State aid scheme in Belgium,271 it was accepted that those 
undertakings already authorised to benefit from the State aid scheme would not be required to 
repay the aid received, and could also take advantage of certain transitional measures while 
the aid scheme was being dismantled. The case was brought on behalf of those undertakings 
which had applied for authorisation under the State aid scheme, but had not yet had that 
authorisation granted. On the basis that once an application had been made, it was inevitably 
granted, those undertakings claimed that they too had a legitimate expectation that they 
would benefit from the State aid scheme. 
The Court of First Instance agreed with the applicant that their legitimate expectations had 
been breached, taking their subjective knowledge into account. In doing so, it went against 
settled case law on legitimate expectations, holding that the initiation of the formal 
investigation procedure in relation to a suspected aid measure could not preclude the 
application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.272 Given the 
circumstances of the case, in particular the Commission’s earlier assessment of a previous 
scheme, the applicant could not have pre-judged the outcome of the formal investigation 
procedure. This conclusion was in direct contradiction with previous case law on State aid 
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270 Case C-373/07 P Mebrom NV v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2009:218 at [92]. 
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and legitimate expectations, where initiation of the formal investigation procedure is held to 
create a situation of uncertainty regarding the aid measure, and thus there can be no 
legitimate expectation that the aid will be found to be compatible with the Treaties.273 Indeed, 
the Court of Justice overturned the Court of First Instance’s finding that a legitimate 
expectation had arisen and been breached, although it did not specifically reject the 
arguments of the Court of First Instance in relation to the formal investigation procedure. 
Nevertheless, in a subsequent case the Court of Justice reiterated its previous position that 
initiating the formal investigation procedure precluded a diligent economic operator from 
relying on the continuity of aid.274 
Plantanol, Mebrom and Koninklijke Friesland Foods could be the early signs of a greater 
willingness to take subjective factors into account when determining the existence of a 
legitimate expectation, perhaps through the influence of European jurisdictions such as the 
English one where such factors are relevant for how a legitimate expectation is to be 
understood. In the end, a fusion between the two approaches would result in the Court 
considering what a reasonable person in the applicant’s position or line of business would 
have thought, bearing in mind the particular information and knowledge which the applicant 
(as proven on the facts) is known to have. 
b) A wider relevance for the concept of the “prudent trader” 
Another aspect to note about the development of the concept of the “prudent trader” is the 
possibility that it might have a wider application than simply when determining whether the 
conduct allegedly in breach of the legitimate expectation was foreseeable. This is evident in 
one case in particular: Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission.275 
Belgium and Forum 187 was a case involving almost exactly the same fact pattern as 
Koninklijke Friesland Foods, in which a tax scheme that certain co-ordination centres had 
benefited from was found by the Commission to constitute unlawful State aid, but due to two 
previous decisions that the aid was lawful, the applicants argued that the principle of 
legitimate expectations prevented it from ordering recovery from the co-ordination centres. 
The Court applied the concept of the prudent trader in a new way to support its finding that a 
legitimate expectation had indeed arisen on the facts, specifically stating that since the regime 
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under scrutiny was “a tax regime under which authorisations for a period of 10 years are 
granted, which calls for measures of an accounting nature and financial and economic 
decisions which cannot be taken in such a brief time by a prudent economic operator”, the 
time between the decision initiating the formal investigation procedure for suspected State aid 
measures and the Commission’s decision finding unlawful State aid (8 months) was 
insufficient.276  
The prudent trader thus becomes relevant because of the care such a person would take in 
their financial decision-making and planning, affecting the length of time which the 
Commission would have to leave after the initiation of the formal procedure in order to 
comply with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, rather than for their ability 
to foresee a Commission finding of unlawful State aid. This wider application of the concept 
of the prudent trader is also a rare indication of a more lenient approach of the Courts to the 
position of the individual in a legitimate expectation relationship. The knowledge and 
expertise of the hypothetical individual is used to justify a legitimate expectation, rather than 
deny it. 
2. The role of an individual’s reliance in the test for legitimate expectations 
As explained above, an individual’s reliance on assurances made by Union institutions has 
played a much lesser role in the development of the Luxembourg courts’ jurisprudence on 
legitimate expectations than it has done in the protection of such expectations by English 
courts.277 Recent case law of the Court of Justice however indicates a growing role for 
reliance as a relevant consideration when determining the existence of a legitimate 
expectation, as from time to time arguments based on reliance are made by the parties and 
considered by the Court. Nevertheless, the way in which reliance is understood by the Court 
of Justice is subtly different to the way in which the English courts conceive it. 
a) The concept of reliance applied by the Court of Justice 
Where the Court of Justice has considered reliance to be a relevant factor, it has applied its 
particular concept of reliance to the case at hand. This is most clearly illustrated in 
Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV,278 the Court of Justice’s decision on appeal 
of Koninklijke Friesland Foods discussed above. There, the Court found that the 
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distinguishing factor between the two groups of undertakings (some already authorised under 
the State aid scheme and others having simply applied for such authorisation) was the fact 
that the former “suffered losses owing to investments made and commitments undertaken in 
the past, at a time when the legality of the tax scheme in question had not been in doubt”, 
while the latter had simply relied on the fact that they would be able to benefit in the future 
from the advantages that authorisation would bring.279 In order to benefit from a legitimate 
expectation, the applicants would have had to demonstrate that they had suffered actual loss 
as a result of reliance on a scheme they considered to be legal. This is a different approach to 
the concept of reliance which has been adopted in certain decisions of the English courts. For 
example, in Bibi, Lord Justice Schiemann giving the judgment of the Court emphasised that 
reliance need not involve concrete detriment, or indeed a change in position of the individuals 
harbouring the legitimate expectation, but could be found, for example, in the “prolonged 
disappointment and “potential detriment [caused by] the deflection of the possibility” that 
their expectation would be fulfilled.280 
b) The relevance of reliance for the existence of a legitimate expectation 
In recent years, the concept of reliance has been given a more prominent place in the exercise 
undertaken by the Court of Justice when determining whether a legitimate expectation has 
arisen. This is evident from a number of cases, most notably in Koninklijke 
FrieslandCampina, discussed above. In that case the Court used the concept of reliance to 
distinguish the case before them from Belgium and Forum 187, a case in which on essentially 
the same facts, undertakings who had applied for an authorisation but not yet been granted it 
at the time when the State aid was found incompatible with the Treaty did benefit from a 
legitimate expectation, and were not required to pay back the aid. The Court noted that in 
Belgium and Forum 187 it had taken account of the significant investments and long-term 
investments made by undertakings, and compared this with the position of the applicant 
Koninklijke FrieslandCampina which had not provided evidence of investments made or 
commitments already undertaken. Rather than alleging current reliance, the applicant in 
Koninklijke FrieslandCampina appeared to challenge the fact of not being able to benefit in 
the future, from the advantage of authorisation.281 The specific difference between the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
279 Case C-519/07 P Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV, ECLI:EU:C:2009:556 at [94]. 
280 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607 at [51] to [55]. 
281 Case C-519/07 P Commission of the European Communities v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:556 at [91] to [93]. 
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cases, which led to the Court’s rejection of the claim of legitimate expectation in Koninklijke 
FrieslandCampina, was that the undertakings in Belgium and Forum 187 had made 
applications for renewal of authorisations under the scheme, while Koninklijke 
FrieslandCampina had made an initial application for authorisation. In the former case the 
individual undertaking had already obtained some benefit under the scheme. 
An individual’s reliance on their expectation was also given a prominent place in the Court’s 
reasoning in Plantanol. While emphasising that it was the role of the national court to 
determine whether the implementing legislation complied with the general principles of legal 
certainty and legitimate expectations,282 the Court gave detailed guidance to the referring 
court on how to carry out this exercise. To this end the Court considered it a relevant factor 
for the national court to take into account that a trader had made costly investments on the 
basis of a pre-existing tax exemption scheme.283 
In other cases, reliance has played a more implicit role in the Court’s reasoning, as part of an 
approach which focuses on the consequences of breaching possible expectations. For 
example, in Traum EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia «Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna 
praktika» Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite and 
Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening v Minister van Sociale Zaken 
en Werkgelegenheid the Court held that where changes to the rules are “liable to entail 
financial consequences” the principle of protection of legitimate expectations warrants 
stricter application.284  
These cases show a greater willingness of the Court to uphold a legitimate expectation (or 
subject the institution under review to closer scrutiny) where it appears that an undertaking 
has suffered detriment in reliance on a legitimate expectation. The Court has not made it 
explicit in its reasoning whether detriment resulting from reliance is enough to ground a 
finding of a legitimate expectation in the absence of precise assurances, although its emphasis 
on the need to apply the principle of protection of legitimate expectations strictly in cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
282 Case C-201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539 at [44] to [45]. 
283 Case C-201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539 at [52]. This 
appraoch was affirmed in case C-98/14 Berlington Hungary Tanácsadó és Szolgáltató kft and Others v Magyar 
Állam at [87]. 
284 Case C-492/13 Traum EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia «Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika» Varna 
pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite at [29]; Joined cases C-383/06 to C-385/06 
Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening v Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
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where negative financial consequences could otherwise ensue would imply that in such cases 
other requirements for establishing a legitimate expectation should be relaxed. Previously, the 
Court of Justice has been resistant to arguments based on detrimental reliance suffered by 
individuals asserting legitimate expectations. In Unicredito Italiano SpA v Agenzia delle 
Entrate, Ufficio Genova 1 it rejected the argument that adverse effects on the finances of 
undertakings of a Commission Decision finding State aid incompatible with the common 
market should prevent recovery of the aid they had been granted, as such an approach would 
undermine the effectiveness of the State aid regime.285 Similarly, in Spain v Council and 
Dansk Rørindustri A/S v Commission the Court cited arguments raised by the parties based on 
the reliance they claimed to have placed on the pre-existing legal situation, but implicitly 
rejected them, by deciding the cases, respectively, on the basis of foreseeability of legislative 
change and lack of a precise assurance.286 Given this context, the Court’s reasoning in 
Koninklijke FrieslandCampina and Plantanol may have been a result of a desire to reach a 
particular outcome. In Koninklijke FrieslandCampina the Court was clearly keen to limit the 
effect of its decision in Belgium and Forum 187 on future cases, to restrict the situations in 
which the Commission would be prevented from ordering recovery of unlawfully disbursed 
State aid. In Plantanol, the focus on reliance may have been the result of the context in which 
the legitimate expectation claim arose, namely a preliminary reference procedure, and of the 
backdrop of the arguments which had been raised in the main proceedings before the national 
court. 
III. The Court’s approach to the protection of legitimate expectations 
The Court’s approach to the protection of legitimate expectations has generally remained the 
same, even in its more recent jurisprudence – in particular, it continues to apply its test for 
finding a legitimate expectation strictly. However, some recent cases show a growing 
tendency for the Court of Justice to recognise procedural as well as substantive aspects of the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations. 
As discussed above, unlike the course of its development in the jurisprudence of the English 
courts, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as applied by the European 
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[110]. 
286 Case C-310/04 Spain v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:521 at [80] and [84]; Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 
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courts has not distinguished between the procedural and substantive legitimate expectations, 
whether in terms of the content of the expectation or the way in which it is protected. While 
they often arise in the same cases, procedural rights are given quite separate treatment from 
any claimed legitimate expectation.287 However, an expectation of a particular procedure, and 
particularly the protection of a substantive legitimate expectation by according additional 
procedural rights, have arisen to some extent in the recent case law of the Court of Justice, 
particularly in the contexts of recovery of sums unlawfully paid, State aid, and competition 
law. 
1. A “legitimate expectation of a procedural nature” 
In one recent case, upheld on appeal to the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance 
arguably accepted that a legitimate expectation that a particular procedure will be followed 
can arise under EU law. Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission288 was an application for 
annulment of a Commission decision classifying aid granted by Italy to the applicants as 
incompatible with the Treaties on the basis that it was being granted primarily for economic, 
rather than environmental, purposes. The case was complicated by the fact that different 
aspects of Ferriere Nord’s business fell within the Treaties of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Community; although separate notifications had been made 
under each Treaty, the applicant had not kept separate accounts as to the parts of its business 
covered by the different Treaty regimes. 
One of the grounds on which Ferriere Nord challenged the Commission’s decision was that it 
“failed to provide the protection which ought to be given to a legitimate expectation of a 
procedural nature”. Since the Commission had not asked the applicant or the Italian 
authorities, at the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, to provide evidence 
establishing the environmental objective of the aid, it was argued that the Commission should 
not be able to draw consequences from the fact that no such evidence had been provided.289 
This argument was accepted by the Court of First Instance, which stated that the Commission 
must take account of any legitimate expectations generated by what was stated in the decision 
opening the formal investigation procedure for State aid. However, on the facts, the opening 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
287 See, for example, Joined cases C-630/11 P to C-633/11 P HGA Srl and others v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:387 at [52] to [53] and [129] to [137]. 
288 Case T-176/01 Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2004:336 upheld on appeal to the Court of 
Justice at Case C-49/05 P Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:259. 
289 Case T-176/01 Ferriere Nord SpA v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2004:336 at [83]. 
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procedure did give a “sufficiently clear and precise” indication to the Italian authorities and 
the applicant that they should “provide all the relevant evidence capable of showing that the 
investment had a principally environmental objective.290 
Craig has used this case as a basis for stating that EU law does recognise procedural 
legitimate expectations.291 However, he is not able to cite any further evidence for this view. 
It is true that when it refers to a “legitimate expectation of a procedural nature” the Court of 
First Instance refers to a previous case, ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi v Commission,292 which 
provides much stronger support for the recognition of procedural legitimate expectations in 
EU law. In that case the Court of First Instance found that the Commission decision opening 
the procedure for the investigation of a possible State aid measure indicated that the 
Commission would examine what portion of the alleged aid fell outside of the scope of the 
ECSC Treaty, but did not clearly specify that the parties would have to communicate 
evidence in this regard. The parties were thus entitled to expect that the Commission would 
request them to provide such evidence before making its decision on the compatibility of the 
aid with the Treaties.293 The fact that the Commission failed either to carry out the 
examination it had described or make any request for more information was enough to 
dispose of the case.294  
Although ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi was applied in Ferriere Nord, in the latter case the 
Court of First Instance dismissed the possibility of any procedural legitimate expectation 
arising on the facts. Since then, the possibility of a “legitimate expectation of a procedural 
nature” has not arisen in the case law of the EU courts,295 and in any case it has never been 
discussed by the Court of Justice.296 This indicates a negligible role for procedural legitimate 
expectations to play in EU law. It may be that such expectations only become relevant in 
State aid cases, where once a formal investigation procedure is opened the opportunities for 
substantive legitimate expectations may be few, as a prudent trader is not entitled to form a 
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291 Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edition, 2012) p 582. 
292 Case T-6/99 ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2001:145. 
293 Case T-6/99 ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2001:145 at [126] to [128]. 
294 Case T-6/99 ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2001:145 at [130] to [135]. 
295 A search for “legitimate expectation of a procedural nature” on Eur-LEX only brings up the two cases 
mentioned above. 
296 On appeal, the Court of Justice rejected the pleas on legitimate expectations in Case C-49/05 P Ferriere Nord 
SpA v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:259 on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction, since these repeated questions of 
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legitimate expectation that the aid will be compatible with the common market. Since the 
procedure is so strict, it may be necessary to offer individuals alternative protection to ensure 
that aid assessment is carried out fairly and with due respect for procedural rights. A further 
interesting point to note, in contrast to the operation of the protection of procedural legitimate 
expectations in English law, is that in ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi the procedural 
expectation was upheld by annulling the challenged measure – that is, through the application 
of a substantive remedy. 
2. Procedural protection of (substantive) legitimate expectations 
The recent case law of the Court of Justice also indicates a growing willingness to protect 
legitimate expectations via procedural rather than substantive methods, often through the 
mechanism of transitional measures. These can be considered “procedural” in the sense that 
they offer the individual who benefits from them a guarantee as to the procedure by which the 
decision in breach of their expectation will be taken, namely that such a decision will not be 
taken without providing for some sort of grace period. In other cases, the Court of Justice has 
also recognised a wider relevance for procedural guarantees in giving effect to legitimate 
expectations. 
Procedural protection of legitimate expectations through the application of transitional 
measures can either occur at the stage where the Court considers whether a legitimate 
expectation has arisen, or when the Court determines what relief should be available for 
breach of a legitimate expectation. The first type of case is exemplified by a line of case law 
concerning the retroactive restriction of limitation periods, particularly in the context of taxes 
levied contrary to EU law.297 Here, the Court has held that a legitimate expectation arises 
automatically, by operation of law, in conjunction with the EU law principles of effectiveness 
and legal certainty, in order to ensure an individual’s directly effective rights under EU law 
are not unduly restricted. However, a national authority can ensure compliance with those 
principles where it provides for a transitional period, after the announcement of the 
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retroactive curtailment of the limitation period.298 Any duty to take into account legitimate 
expectations is thus discharged by the application of a transitional period. 
An example of the second type of case is Belgium and Forum 187. This is a rare case in 
which the Court of Justice was willing to accept that a legitimate expectation had arisen. One 
of the justifications for the finding of a legitimate expectation was the short period of time 
between the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure in relation to a possible 
State aid measure and the decision that the aid was incompatible with the Treaty.299 This lack 
of time for individuals to arrange their affairs led to a finding that the “contested decision 
must be annulled in so far as it does not lay down transitional measures”.300 Once transitional 
measures were put in place (by the Commission) the decision on incompatibility would stand. 
Other cases have raised the possibility of wider procedural protection of legitimate 
expectations. Berlington Hungary Tanácsadó és Szolgáltató kft and Others v Magyar Állam 
was a preliminary reference procedure in which the Hungarian referring court raised a 
number of questions concerning the compatibility of taxes on slot machines and gambling 
which had been increased without the introduction of a transitional period.301 Although on the 
specific facts of the case, the relevant procedural protection claimed was a transitional or 
“adaptation” period, it was implicit in the Court’s statement that “a trader cannot place 
reliance on there being no legislative amendment whatever, but can only call into question 
the arrangements for the implementation of such an amendment” that wider procedural 
protection might be available in other circumstances.302  
An example of such wider protection has occurred in the context of the setting of fines for 
breaches of competition law. In Quinn Barlo Ltd and others v Commission,303 the Court 
referred to its case law on the duty of the Commission to follow guidelines or rules of 
conduct that it has previously published. Where the Commission chooses to depart from its 
published guidelines in individual cases, in order to comply with the principle of protection 
of legitimate expectations it must “give reasons that are compatible with the principle of 
equal treatment”. However, the Court defined the scope of such procedural protection rather 
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narrowly – the Commission’s self-imposed guidelines could not bind the Courts of the 
European Union in the same way where they exercised their unlimited jurisdiction to 
substitute their own appraisal of the level of the fines imposed for the Commission’s 
calculations.304  
The possibility of procedural protection was also raised by the applicants in argument in 
another case concerning fines imposed for infringement of EU competition law, Dansk 
Rørindustri A/S v Commission.305 They submitted that at the Commission should at least have 
warned them of a change in the way it calculated those fines, namely its move from following 
a “consistent and long-standing practice” to applying the calculated method set out in new 
guidelines adopted both after the infringements and after the hearings held in relation to those 
infringements.306 This argument was however rejected by the Court of Justice, which relied 
on the fact that the Commission has a discretion to raise the general level of fines at any time, 
if necessary to ensure the implementation of EU competition policy to deny the existence of a 
legitimate expectation.307 
In Dansk Rørindustri the applicants relied on the case of Ferriere San Carlo v 
Commission,308 in which it had found that there was a duty incumbent on the Commission to 
warn the undertaking in question that it was discontinuing its practice of tolerating deliveries 
in excess of import quotas, where that practice had been ongoing for two years. The Court of 
Justice held that such a duty could not arise on the facts of Dansk Rørindustri “because of the 
specific context of the Commission’s supervisory powers in competition law”,309 implying 
that a duty to warn individuals of changes to long-standing practices could still apply in 
relation to other areas of law. Since then the Court has rejected an argument raised in 
Mebrom that the Commission should have expressly warned undertakings of a change to the 
licensing system for the importation of methyl bromide, holding that the change was 
foreseeable in the light of a previously published Regulation and that in any case the 
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applicants themselves expected changes.310 This leaves open the possibility that a duty to 
warn could arise in future situations such as that in Ferriere San Carlo, where the change in 
administrative practice came as a complete surprise to the affected undertaking.  
The developing jurisprudence on procedural protection could indicate an increased flexibility 
in the approach of the Court of Justice to the protection of legitimate expectations. As yet 
such protection operates in narrow confines in relation to specific issues raised before the 
Court of Justice. However, the Court could use its statement in Berlington Hungary that a 
trader might be able to “call into question the arrangements for the implementation of [a 
legislative amendment]” as a springboard for the wider applicability of procedural protection 
for legitimate expectations.311 
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Recent cases of the courts of the European Union and England and Wales show that the 
protection of legitimate expectations in both jurisdiction is still developing. As to be 
expected, this development is more marked in relation to the principle of protection of 
legitimate expectations in English law, which was previously characterised by a reluctance to 
substantively review administrative decision-making, and where the courts were more 
tentative in applying that principle in early case law. 
On the level of discourse, it is clear that the English and European courts chose different 
ways to express what they are doing when they protect legitimate expectations. Terms such 
as fairness and abuse of power employed by the English courts have a more individual-
centric focus, whereas the language adopted by the European Union indicates a much more 
economics-based approach. To some extent, this language is translated into action. In 
comparison to the experience before the Court of Justice, an individual claiming a legitimate 
expectation in English law will find it easier to establish a legitimate expectation. This is in 
part due to the fact that considerations of fairness can operate to remove or make less strict 
some of the otherwise mandatory requirements for establishing a legitimate expectation. 
Nevertheless, an underlying theme of the recent case law, when comparisons are drawn 
between the two jurisdictions, is that jurisprudential change and development is leading to 
greater similarities in the protection of legitimate expectations by both court systems. Some 
of these changes will be discussed in more detail below, with specific reference to the 
findings made above. This convergence is not just a result of the reception of EU law by the 
English courts, but also due to changes experienced at EU level – perhaps something of a 
middle way between the protection of legitimate expectations as originally conceived in both 
jurisdictions is on the horizon. However, the analysis also indicates that courts in both 
jurisdictions are wary of external influence. Where English courts are faced with cases 
involving EU law, they rarely explicitly apply the test for legitimate expectations, instead 
relying on English case law as precedent. This inevitably leads to factors such as reliance 
being taken into account, sometimes determinatively for the outcome of the case, which 
would have much less relevance under the test in EU law. In the cases where English courts 
do recognise an obligation to apply EU law, this is done in conjunction with the test in 
national law – the implication is that the challenged administrative action can and should be 
assessed against the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as it has been 
78	  
	  
developed in both legal systems. This approach conflicts with that adopted by the Court of 
Justice, which has held (for example in the case Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale 
Werkvoorziening)  that where conduct falls within the scope of EU law, there is no room for 
the application of a national principle of protection of legitimate expectations.312 
I. State of knowledge of the individual 
The case law on the state of knowledge of the individual claiming a legitimate expectation 
has, in the English courts, been characterised by a consideration of both objective and 
subjective factors – what a person is entitled to or should expect, and what they actually 
expected. This can be contrasted with the almost exclusively objective approach adopted in 
cases heard by the European courts. However, recent case law indicates greater convergence 
in the courts approach. In some cases, notably Davies, English courts are adopting a more 
objective approach, applying a standard of a hypothetical individual rather than taking into 
account the particular knowledge of the applicant before them. On the other side, in cases 
such as Mebrom and Plantanol European courts have been more willing to take into account 
factors which are specific to the individual or undertaking in question. 
Regarding the relevance of an individual’s reliance on an assurance made by a public 
authority, greater similarity between the approaches of the English and European courts is 
also evident. Moving away from the original position where reliance was considered an 
essential element for establishing a claim of legitimate expectation before an English court, 
and had no role to play in European law, arguments based on reliance and financial loss are 
now taken into account by European courts, while some English judges have suggested that 
reliance might not be relevant in certain circumstances. However, there are important 
differences between what constitutes reliance for the protection of legitimate expectations in 
English and European law, with the European courts adopting a more “concrete” approach 
and requiring financial detriment. This might simply be a consequence of the nature of the 
claimants appearing before the Court of Justice, who will usually be traders and businesses. 
Similarly, the argument in Abbassi that a person who does not know of an assurance cannot 
rely on it, and can therefore not benefit from a legitimate expectation, contrasts with the 
approach of the European courts to legitimate expectations in cases such as Test Claimants 
where the principle of effectiveness demands that expectations are given effect to – here an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
312 Joined Cases C-383/06 to C-385/06 Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening v 
Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, ECLI:EU:C:2008:165 at [53] and [57]. 
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expectation arises by operation of law, rather than any special facts pertaining to the 
interaction between an individual and a public authority. 
II. Relief 
A growing convergence can also be seen in the relief offered where a breach of legitimate 
expectation is confirmed by the courts. The English remedial jurisdiction has been 
characterised by a high degree of flexibility, which is now increasingly evident in the 
jurisprudence of the European courts as well. A particular example is offering procedural 
protection to substantive legitimate expectations in the form of transitional measures in cases 
such as Test Claimants and Marks and Spencer. Nevertheless, while the European courts 
have expressed their willingness to offer procedural protection, they have not gone quite as 
far as their English counterparts in actually doing so. In Berlington Hungary, although the 
Court of Justice held that the procedure for policy change could be challenged, it did not find 
a precise and specific assurance on the facts. Unlike the approach of the English courts, as 
exemplified in cases such as Luton, the European courts have not been willing to modify the 
standard of review or lower the hurdle for establishing a legitimate expectation where the 
expectation is of a procedural nature or will be protected by procedural means. This may be 
due to the fact that as a general principle of European law, the principle of protection of 
legitimate expectations can be used to challenge and annul Union legislation, a consequence 
which arises automatically where a legitimate expectation is held to be infringed. 
Another important difference in the remedial powers of English and EU courts is the fact that 
a Francovich claim for damages will not result simply from a finding of a European court 
that a legitimate expectation has been infringed. An individual, or a Union institution, will 
have to bring that claim before the court, as the Commission did in the recent case 
Commission v UK. This fact restricts the European courts’ ability to remedy any damage 
caused by a legitimate expectation. While an English court is free to apply a mandatory or 
injunctive order to a public authority to protect the interest to which the expectation relates, 
the European court is dependent on whatever claim is brought by the individual challenging 
the breach of legitimate expectation. 
III. Concluding thoughts 
The differences which remain in place between the way legitimate expectations are protected 
in English and EU law are a factor of both the historical beginnings and development of that 
protection within each jurisdiction and the wider context of the administrative laws in which 
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that protection developed. These factors remain relevant to how legitimate expectations are 
protected in both jurisdictions today. In the context of these differences, it is surprising that 
there is any convergence between the different courts’ approaches at all. The fact that such 
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